·PIB·15 marks·250–350 wordsPolityDefence

Evaluate the effectiveness of unilateral terrorist designations by India in curbing cross-border terror financing and infiltration, especially from Pakistan-based entities.

In this answer
  1. Where designation delivers
  2. Where it falls short

Section 35 of the UAPA, 1967, as amended in 2019, empowers the Centre to designate individuals as terrorists in the Fourth Schedule [1][2]. The July 2026 listing of 23 Pakistan/PoK-based operatives shows the tool is used vigorously — its impact, however, is real but partial.

Where designation delivers

  • Closes the renaming loophole: before 2019 only outfits could be proscribed, so operatives resurfaced through front organisations; individual listing attaches liability to the person, not the label [2].
  • Financial and mobility squeeze: listing enables asset freezing, travel curbs and disruption of fundraising and recruitment channels — the grounds cited for the 2026 batch, which included arms smuggling and infiltration facilitation [3].
  • Builds the dossier for multilateral action: national designations supply the evidentiary base for UNSC 1267 Committee listing requests and for FATF/APG scrutiny, which had faulted Pakistan for weak prosecution of LeT–JeM fund-raising [4][5].
  • Policy coherence: it complements the NIA's expanded mandate and MHA's national counter-terrorism strategy, signalling zero tolerance [6].

Where it falls short

  • Jurisdictional futility: designees operate from Pakistan and PoK with no assets or presence in India, so freeze orders remain largely declaratory.
  • No binding effect on third states: unlike a 1267 listing, a unilateral Indian notification creates no obligation abroad — and consensus-based 1267 decisions are themselves vulnerable to prolonged blocking [5].
  • Infiltration is capability-driven: tunnels, drone-dropped consignments and hawala/informal channels persist irrespective of who is named.
  • Due-process concerns: designation is an executive act not requiring a pending criminal case, with only a de-notification review — inviting criticism that dilutes its diplomatic persuasiveness [1].

Designation is therefore best evaluated as an effective signalling and evidence-building instrument rather than an operational curb on money and men. Its value will multiply if paired with faster 1267 follow-through, tighter cooperation on trade-based and crypto laundering, and a published, time-bound review procedure — aligning security imperatives with rule-of-law credibility.

Sources

  1. 1Section 35, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — India Codeindividual designation power, Fourth Schedule, procedure and de-notification review
  2. 2The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill/Act, 2019 — PRS Legislative Researchextension of designation from organisations to individuals; NIA powers
  3. 3Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalization (CTCR) Division, Ministry of Home Affairsdesignation of Pakistan/PoK-based individuals; combating financing of terrorism mandate
  4. 4FATF — Pakistan country page and mutual evaluation/follow-up reportsdeficiencies in investigating and prosecuting terror financing by LeT/JeM
  5. 5UN Security Council 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Listbinding multilateral listing mechanism; consensus-based Committee decisions
  6. 6PRAHAAR — National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Home Affairsinstitutional counter-terrorism framework within which designation operates
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