Evaluate the effectiveness of unilateral terrorist designations by India in curbing cross-border terror financing and infiltration, especially from Pakistan-based entities.

Q. Evaluate the effectiveness of unilateral terrorist designations by India in curbing cross-border terror financing and infiltration, especially from Pakistan-based entities. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Section 35 of the UAPA, 1967, as amended in 2019, empowers the Centre to designate individuals as terrorists in the Fourth Schedule [1][2]. The July 2026 listing of 23 Pakistan/PoK-based operatives shows the tool is used vigorously — its impact, however, is real but partial.

Where designation delivers - Closes the renaming loophole: before 2019 only outfits could be proscribed, so operatives resurfaced through front organisations; individual listing attaches liability to the person, not the label [2]. - Financial and mobility squeeze: listing enables asset freezing, travel curbs and disruption of fundraising and recruitment channels — the grounds cited for the 2026 batch, which included arms smuggling and infiltration facilitation [3]. - Builds the dossier for multilateral action: national designations supply the evidentiary base for UNSC 1267 Committee listing requests and for FATF/APG scrutiny, which had faulted Pakistan for weak prosecution of LeT–JeM fund-raising [4][5]. - Policy coherence: it complements the NIA's expanded mandate and MHA's national counter-terrorism strategy, signalling zero tolerance [6].

Where it falls short - Jurisdictional futility: designees operate from Pakistan and PoK with no assets or presence in India, so freeze orders remain largely declaratory. - No binding effect on third states: unlike a 1267 listing, a unilateral Indian notification creates no obligation abroad — and consensus-based 1267 decisions are themselves vulnerable to prolonged blocking [5]. - Infiltration is capability-driven: tunnels, drone-dropped consignments and hawala/informal channels persist irrespective of who is named. - Due-process concerns: designation is an executive act not requiring a pending criminal case, with only a de-notification review — inviting criticism that dilutes its diplomatic persuasiveness [1].

Designation is therefore best evaluated as an effective signalling and evidence-building instrument rather than an operational curb on money and men. Its value will multiply if paired with faster 1267 follow-through, tighter cooperation on trade-based and crypto laundering, and a published, time-bound review procedure — aligning security imperatives with rule-of-law credibility.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Section 35, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — India Code — individual designation power, Fourth Schedule, procedure and de-notification review 2. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill/Act, 2019 — PRS Legislative Research — extension of designation from organisations to individuals; NIA powers 3. Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalization (CTCR) Division, Ministry of Home Affairs — designation of Pakistan/PoK-based individuals; combating financing of terrorism mandate 4. FATF — Pakistan country page and mutual evaluation/follow-up reports — deficiencies in investigating and prosecuting terror financing by LeT/JeM 5. UN Security Council 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List — binding multilateral listing mechanism; consensus-based Committee decisions 6. PRAHAAR — National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Home Affairs — institutional counter-terrorism framework within which designation operates