Examine the adequacy of existing international space law in addressing the militarization of outer space. Suggest measures to strengthen the arms-control architecture.

The Outer Space Treaty, 1967 — foundation of international space law, with 115 parties as of March 2024 — prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit and mandates peaceful use of celestial bodies [1]. Yet the U.S. Air Force Secretary's confirmation (September 2026) that the Space Force has "space control" weapons on orbit exposes how thinly this framework covers conventional militarization [2].

Where the existing regime holds

• The WMD ban and the non-appropriation principle have survived the Cold War intact; no nuclear weapon has been stationed in orbit [1].
• The Liability Convention fixes responsibility on the launching State for damage caused by its space object, giving debris harm a legal address [3].
• Registration and rescue obligations sustain a baseline of transparency and cooperation among spacefaring States [1].

Where it falls short

• Conventional weapons gap: kinetic interceptors and non-kinetic tools (jamming, spoofing, directed energy) fall outside the WMD-only prohibition [1][2].
• Effects, not objects: a ground-based jammer places nothing in orbit, so it escapes the treaty's reach entirely [2].
• Attribution and verification: a degraded satellite signal cannot easily be distinguished from solar interference or equipment failure, making liability claims largely theoretical [3].
• Negotiating deadlock: recent attempts in both the General Assembly and the Security Council to adopt a document on a weapons-free outer space have failed [3]; the dual-use character of almost every satellite defeats any agreed definition of a "space weapon".
• Debris externality: hit-to-kill engagements, as in India's Mission Shakti (2019), generate fragments indifferent to nationality [4].

Way forward

Conclude the legally binding instrument under negotiation in the UN GGE and Open-Ended Working Group on PAROS [5]; meanwhile build incremental, behaviour-based norms — prior notification of close approaches, restraint on debris-generating tests, and confidence-building measures — since these ask no State to surrender an existing capability. India, heavily dependent on satellites for navigation, banking and disaster warning, should anchor its diplomacy in this track while strengthening domestic space-situational awareness. Preserving space as the "province of all mankind" now demands rules of conduct, not merely rules of possession.