Examine the challenges in ensuring accountability of political functionaries in cases of alleged custodial or coercion-related deaths of marginalised individuals.

Accountability for deaths of Dalits linked to custody or coercion tests whether constitutional safeguards can reach those who wield power. The National Commission for Scheduled Castes' notice to Punjab's Chief Secretary and DGP over the death of a Dalit daily wager in Sangrur, who named a sitting Minister in a video before dying, shows both the mechanism and its limits [2][1].

Investigative and evidentiary challenges

• The state police investigate a case implicating their own political executive, creating a conflict of interest at the first stage of evidence collection [2].
• Video or dying statements require corroboration; delayed FIRs, weak forensic preservation and hostile witnesses erode the case.
• Scale outpaces sanction — the NHRC's 2022-23 Annual Report records over 2,300 intimations of death in judicial custody and 168 in police custody in a single year, with disciplinary action rare [3].

Legal and institutional gaps

• The NCSC under Article 338 can inquire and summon, but its findings are recommendatory, not binding on a state government [1].
• India has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Torture; the Law Commission's 273rd Report (2017), proposing a Prevention of Torture Bill and shifting the burden of proof onto the accused official, remains unimplemented [4].
• Coercion outside formal custody fits no clear statutory category, while trials in Special Courts under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are slow, depressing convictions [5].

Political and social asymmetry

• Marginalised families depend on local power structures for wages and land, inviting withdrawal of complaints and witness intimidation.
• There is no convention of a Minister stepping aside pending inquiry; accountability collapses into partisan demands rather than institutional process [2].
• Central commissions directing state bureaucracy also generate Centre-State friction, slowing compliance [2].

The core deficit is therefore institutional independence, not absence of law. Transferring such investigations outside the state police chain, time-bound Special Court trials, statutory force with tabled action-taken reports for NCSC recommendations, and a domestic anti-torture statute would convert inquiry into consequence — giving real content to the promises of Articles 17 and 21.