Examine the constitutional concerns raised regarding Parliament's competence to restrict State taxation of mineral-bearing lands.

The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 bars States from imposing any tax, cess or levy on mineral rights or mineral-bearing lands except on Centre-prescribed conditions [1][2]. Coming barely two years after the Supreme Court's Mineral Area Development Authority (MADA) verdict (2024) affirmed State taxing power, it raises serious questions of legislative competence and federal balance.

Legislative competence under the Seventh Schedule

• Entry 54, Union List permits Parliament to regulate mines and mineral development; the 2024 Bench held this does not extend to taxing land itself [2].
• Entry 50, State List (taxes on mineral rights) is expressly "subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament" — but Entry 49 (taxes on lands) carries no such rider [2].
• By creating a new category of "mineral-bearing lands" defined by Centre-prescribed mineral content, Parliament arguably enters the State field of land under Entries 18 and 49 [1][2].

Overriding a judicial verdict

• The Act invalidates State levies unrecovered before its commencement, effectively nullifying dues the Court allowed from 1 April 2005 [2].
• Settled doctrine holds that a legislature may remove the basis of a judgment, but cannot declare a judicial decision invalid or non-binding by fiat [2].

Article 14 and equality

• Entities that defaulted escape liability, while compliant payers get no refund — a differential outcome without intelligible basis, vulnerable under Article 14 [2].

Excessive delegation

• Conditions of taxation are left wholly to executive prescription without statutory guiding principles, delegating an essential legislative function [2].

The Act's objective — a predictable, uniform fiscal regime that lowers mining costs and attracts investment — is legitimate [1]. Yet certainty achieved by narrowing States' constitutionally allocated revenue base risks litigation and erodes trust. A durable solution lies in prescribing the limits through Parliament itself under Entry 50, with mineral-rich States consulted via the GST Council-style consensus mechanism, so that fiscal predictability and cooperative federalism advance together.