Examine how constitutional gaps (e.g., absence of a caretaker-government provision) can affect democratic transitions, with reference to Bangladesh's 2024–26 experience.

Q. Examine how constitutional gaps (e.g., absence of a caretaker-government provision) can affect democratic transitions, with reference to Bangladesh's 2024–26 experience. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

A constitution's silence on how power changes hands is tested only during rupture. Bangladesh's Fifteenth Amendment (2011) deleted the caretaker-government system introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment [1], leaving no codified route for a neutral interim authority — a gap that shaped the entire 2024–26 transition.

How gaps distort a transition - Improvised legitimacy: after the Sheikh Hasina government fell in August 2024, the Muhammad Yunus-led interim setup rested on the doctrine of necessity rather than any express provision — authority derived from circumstance, not text. - Judicialisation of politics: courts became the substitute rule-maker, the High Court (2024) and Appellate Division (2026) striking down parts of the Fifteenth Amendment and restoring caretaker and referendum provisions [1]. - Open-ended unelected rule: with no constitutional clock, the interim government ran roughly eighteen months before polls, widening the accountability deficit. - Contested ground rules: the electoral framework itself had to be renegotiated through the "July Charter", put to a national referendum alongside the 13th parliamentary election on 12 February 2026 [2][3].

Where intact provisions delivered order - Article 48 makes the President electable by members of Parliament, and the Constitution vests the Speaker with acting-President functions during a vacancy [4] — so Shahabuddin's resignation triggered a rule-bound succession, with Speaker Hafiz Uddin Ahmed acting for 90 days. - The Election Commission compressed nomination, scrutiny and polling into 13–20 August 2026 [5], filling the office within the constitutional window — codified text producing certainty precisely where improvisation had earlier produced doubt.

Bangladesh's experience shows that democratic transitions fail or succeed on procedural design, not intent: where the text spoke, succession was orderly; where it was silent, legitimacy had to be manufactured. Embedding neutral, time-bound transition machinery — as the July Charter reforms attempt — is the durable remedy, and advances SDG 16's goal of effective, accountable institutions. For India, a rule-based neighbour strengthens the Neighbourhood First policy.

(~315 words)

Sources: 1. Portions of 15th Amendment scrapped, caretaker govt system restored — Dhaka Tribune — 2011 abolition of the caretaker system and its judicial restoration 2. Elections in Bangladesh: 2026 Parliamentary Elections and National Referendum — IFES — July Charter referendum held with the 13th parliamentary election 3. National election, referendum on Feb 12, 2026 — Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (state news agency) — polling date of 12 February 2026 4. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Part IV, Chapter I (The President) — Ministry of Law, Bangladesh — Article 48 indirect election; Speaker's acting-President role 5. Presidential election on Aug 20: EC — The Daily Star — EC schedule and Shahabuddin's resignation