Examine the constitutional and legal issues arising from police use of facial recognition technology at public protests. Suggest safeguards.

Facial recognition technology (FRT) is software that matches a face caught on camera to a stored record. The Supreme Court is now examining the Delhi Police's use of FRT at the Jantar Mantar protests. The police also used drones and AI-enabled smart glasses there [4]. Using FRT at public protests raises questions about privacy, the right to protest and accountability, and current law does not settle them.

Constitutional issues

• Privacy (Art. 21): Puttaswamy (2017) allows privacy to be limited only through a law that serves a legitimate aim, is necessary and proportionate, and has procedural safeguards [1]. Scanning every person at a protest, when police could target only suspects, fails the necessity test.
• Speech and assembly (Art. 19(1)(a),(b)): protesters who lose their anonymity may stay away, which creates a chilling effect. NITI Aayog itself flags this risk to free speech [3].
• Equality (Art. 14): if the algorithm misidentifies someone, police may take arbitrary action against an innocent person.

Legal issues

• No enabling statute: the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022 covers convicts and arrested persons, not peaceful protesters. This fails the legality limb of the Puttaswamy test.
• DPDP Act exemptions: when data is processed to prevent or investigate offences, citizens' rights and data fiduciary duties do not apply, except the duty of data security. The Centre can also exempt whole agencies on public order grounds [2]. PRS warns that this allows data to be kept longer than needed [2].
• Private vendors: private firms are respondents in the case because they supplied the surveillance tools [4]. It is unclear who is liable for the data they handle.
• Opacity: there are no published rules on how long data is kept, who can access it, or how it is audited.

Safeguards

• Parliament should pass a specific law that allows only targeted FRT use against suspects, with prior judicial or independent approval.
• Narrow the DPDP exemption by adding limits on how long data is kept, rules for deleting it, and a written reason for each use [2].
• Adopt NITI Aayog's FRT framework: limited and legitimate use, regular accuracy audits, and privacy protection built in from the start [3].
• Make vendor contracts public and set up an independent oversight body.
• Ban live FRT at peaceful assemblies unless violence can reasonably be expected.

Police using FRT at protests is not illegal in itself. The problems are the lack of a law, broad exemptions and no clear accountability. A targeted law that follows the Puttaswamy test would let police maintain public order and protect the rights to privacy and dissent under Articles 19 and 21.