Examine the constitutional and legal mechanisms available in India to curb the use of unaccounted money during elections. How effective have judicial interventions been in this regard?

Money power distorts the level playing field that free and fair elections presuppose. India therefore relies on a layered framework — constitutional mandate, statute, and regulatory practice — reinforced, most recently, by the Supreme Court's August 2026 ruling that black money in the electoral process "compromises democracy, rule of law and the electoral process itself" [1].

Constitutional mechanisms

• Article 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission of India (ECI), a plenary power used to issue binding poll-time instructions [2].
• Free and fair elections are read as part of the basic structure, allowing courts to test funding laws against transparency and equality standards [3].

Statutory mechanisms

• Representation of the People Act, 1951: bribery is a corrupt practice under Section 123(1); Section 77 caps candidate expenditure, with false accounts attracting disqualification [4].
• IPC/BNS provisions on electoral offences, and the Income-tax Act and PMLA, 2002 for tracing unaccounted cash.

Regulatory mechanisms

• ECI's Expenditure Monitoring machinery — Flying Squads, Static Surveillance Teams, expenditure observers and the Model Code of Conduct — enables real-time seizure of cash, liquor and freebies [2].

Effectiveness of judicial interventions

• Substantial gains: the Court struck down the Electoral Bonds Scheme (2024) for violating the voter's right to information [3]; the 2026 judgment now mandates seizure reporting to the District Magistrate/competent court within 24 hours with written reasons, and completion of investigation ideally within one year, placing primary responsibility on the ECI [1].
• Persisting limits: courts act post facto and case-by-case; enforcement depends on state police capacity, convictions in bribery cases remain rare, and expenditure ceilings apply to candidates, not parties — gaps the Law Commission's 255th Report on Electoral Reforms had flagged [5].

The judiciary has thus supplied procedural teeth where legislation lagged, but judicial directions cannot substitute for structural reform. Statutory limits on party expenditure, faster election-petition disposal, and a considered move toward transparent, partly state-supported funding would convert episodic judicial vigilance into durable electoral integrity.