Examine the constitutional and statutory basis of the Election Commission's power to conduct Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls. Discuss the safeguards against wrongful deletion of genuine voters.

Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls in the Election Commission of India (ECI) [1], and it is on this plenary mandate that the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) — a house-to-house re-verification distinct from routine summary revision — rests. Phase 3 draft rolls show 6.15 crore deletions from 36.1 crore electors (17.1%) across 17 of 19 States/UTs [2], making the legality of the power and the adequacy of its safeguards a live governance question.

Constitutional and statutory basis

• Article 324 — plenary power over roll preparation; Article 326 makes adult suffrage the value the exercise must serve [1].
• Representation of the People Act, 1950 — Section 15 mandates a roll for every constituency prepared under ECI's superintendence; Sections 16 and 19 fix disqualification and qualification for registration; the Act empowers revision of rolls [3].
• Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 — prescribe the enumeration format, draft publication, and Forms 6, 7 and 8 for claims and objections [4].
• Thus SIR is an intensive revision within existing law, not an extra-legal exercise; its vulnerability is administrative, not jurisdictional.

Safeguards against wrongful deletion

• Procedural: minimum two-three door-to-door BLO attempts with prior intimation before an elector is treated as untraceable; deletion only after recorded reasons in the prescribed format [5].
• Participatory: publication of draft rolls and a statutory claims-and-objections window, with appeal to the District Magistrate and onward to the CEO [5].
• Political: Booth Level Agents nominated by parties verify entries at enumeration and objection stages [5].
• Supervisory: Special Roll Observers deployed in major States — the only check not requiring the voter to act first [6].
• Evidence of efficacy: Phases 1–2 deletions fell from 12.3% at draft stage to 10.5% in final rolls [2].

These safeguards are, however, largely reactive; the untraceable elector least likely to meet the BLO is also least likely to file an objection. Publishing reason-wise deletion splits, reporting restoration rates, and extending Observer cover to all States would make the exercise independently auditable — aligning roll purity with the promise of universal franchise under Article 326.