*Examine the constitutional and statutory basis of parliamentary privileges in India. Why has India not enacted a standalone parliamentary privileges law despite the mandate under Article 105(3)?*
Q. Examine the constitutional and statutory basis of parliamentary privileges in India. Why has India not enacted a standalone parliamentary privileges law despite the mandate under Article 105(3)? (15 marks, 250-350 words)
Parliamentary privileges are the rights and immunities of the Houses and their members, essential to debate without fear or favour. In India their foundation is largely constitutional and conventional; the Article 105(3) mandate to define them by law remains unfulfilled after seven decades.
Constitutional basis - Article 105(1) guarantees freedom of speech in Parliament, subject to the Constitution and the rules of procedure [1]. - Article 105(2) bars court proceedings against a member for anything said or any vote given in the House or its committees, and protects publication authorised by the House [1]. - Article 105(3) leaves residual privileges to be "defined by Parliament by law"; pending that, the pre-44th Amendment position continues. Article 194 mirrors this for State Legislatures, and Article 122 shields internal proceedings from judicial inquiry into irregularity [1]. - Courts have delimited the scope: in Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024), a seven-judge Bench held that immunity does not cover bribery, overruling P.V. Narasimha Rao (1998) [2].
Statutory and procedural basis - No dedicated privileges statute exists; the working framework is the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, under which the Committee of Privileges examines breach-of-privilege notices, and the House may admonish, reprimand or suspend [3]. - Statutory protection is fragmentary — for instance, freedom from arrest in civil cases during and around sessions [3].
Why codification has stalled - Fear of judicial review: a statute would be testable against Part III, letting courts adjudicate what Houses treat as self-regulated [4]. - Preference for flexibility: presiding officers favour case-by-case evolution over rigid definitions [4]. - Tension with press freedom under Article 19(1)(a) — defining "contempt" risks chilling legitimate reporting [4]. - Absence of political consensus, with successive presiding officers' conferences deferring the question.
Privileges thus rest on a firm constitutional core but an uncertain statutory periphery. A narrowly drafted codification — a functional test as in Sita Soren, proportionate penalties and natural justice before the Privileges Committee — would reconcile legislative autonomy with the rule of law, fulfilling both the letter of Article 105(3) and the accountability the Constitution envisages.
(~330 words)
Sources: 1. The Constitution of India, Ministry of Law and Justice — Articles 105, 194 and 122 2. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 161 (Supreme Court of India) — no immunity for bribery; overruling of P.V. Narasimha Rao 3. Lok Sabha Frequently Asked Questions, Sansad.in — Rules of Procedure, Committee of Privileges, breach of privilege and freedom from arrest 4. Parliamentary Privilege FAQs, PRS Legislative Research — uncodified nature of privileges and reasons codification has been avoided