Examine how domestic political gridlock in democracies can constrain defence preparedness, with reference to Taiwan's special defence budget debate.

Defence preparedness in a democracy depends on converting threat perception into assured, multi-year funding. Where the executive lacks a legislative majority, that chain breaks — as Taiwan's stalled special defence and drone budgets illustrate.

Anatomy of the gridlock in Taiwan

• The Executive Yuan submitted its Special Act on Procurement for Strengthening Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities in November 2025; it remained under contested review for months despite classified briefings to all caucuses [2].
• On 8 May 2026 the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan (KMT–TPP) passed a diluted version, cutting the request by about 38% and stripping out domestic uncrewed-systems procurement, including anchor orders for over 200,000 drones [3].
• The separate NT$210 billion drone special act now faces a rival proposal: a NT$40 billion annual ceiling administered outside the Defence Ministry, which the MND warns would constrain capability development [4].

How gridlock erodes preparedness

• Loss of predictability: capability build-up runs on multi-year cycles; annual caps and repeated deferrals fragment acquisition planning [4].
• External delivery queues: President Lai warned that delay risks Taiwan losing priority for weapons deliveries from suppliers [1].
• Industrial base: indigenous production needs assured government demand; zeroing domestic drone orders removes that anchor [3].
• Doctrinal dilution: an asymmetric ("porcupine") strategy reduced to imported platforms loses its core logic [3].

The counter-view: scrutiny is legitimate

• Special, off-cycle budgets escape normal annual scrutiny; legislative interrogation of scale and oversight ministry is a constitutional check, not obstruction alone.
• Executives also under-deliver: in India, defence capital outlay averaged 27% against the Standing Committee's recommended 40%, with committed-liabilities data undisclosed since 2019-20 [5].

Gridlock, therefore, harms preparedness less by refusing money than by denying predictability. The remedy lies not in bypassing legislatures but in insulating defence from partisan cycles — bipartisan standing mechanisms, non-lapsable modernisation funds, and transparent costing — so that democratic scrutiny strengthens, rather than substitutes for, deterrence.