Examine the evolving role and mandate of the Central Industrial Security Force since its inception, in light of recent policy shifts.

Raised in 1969 under the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968, the CISF was conceived as a watch-and-ward force to guard industrial undertakings owned by the Central Government [1]. Six decades on, its mandate has widened far beyond that founding purpose, even as its original PSU role is now being pared back.

From watch-and-ward to an armed force of the Union

• The Act's amendment constituted CISF as an armed force of the Union, replacing a custodial guarding role with armed protective duty [1].
• Strength has grown from about 3,129 personnel at raising to nearly 2.20 lakh today, with 12 reserve battalions and 8 training institutes [2].

Diversification of the security mandate

• CISF today secures around 361 critical national installations — nuclear plants, space centres, ports and power stations [2].
• It functions as India's airport police at nearly 70 airports and guards metro networks, Parliament and heritage monuments [2].
• A Security Consultancy Wing extends advisory cover to private and non-PSU clients such as bank data centres and premier institutes [2].

The recent shift: retreat from the PSU core

• The MHA has approved complete withdrawal of CISF from Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL), the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, by 17 November 2026 — 1,033 Security Wing and 298 Fire Wing posts [3].
• This is the first full exit of CISF from a PSU, and follows the Centre's ₹11,440 crore revival package for a financially stressed RINL [4][3].
• Cost-rationalisation by client PSUs thus now competes with the Force's statutory industrial-security purpose, with alternative arrangements yet unspecified [3].

The CISF's trajectory reflects a force adapting from factory gates to airports, metros and consultancy. Going forward, a transparent framework — clear risk-based criteria for deployment and withdrawal, certified successor arrangements, and continued fire-safety cover — would let the Force concentrate on genuinely critical infrastructure without diluting the protective assurance that the 1968 Act envisaged.