·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Examine the implications of secondary sanctions legislation (such as the Graham Act) on the rules-based multilateral trading system.

In this answer
  1. Erosion of core disciplines
  2. Enforcement vacuum deepens the damage
  3. Asymmetric burden on import-dependent developing economies

Secondary sanctions penalise a third country for commerce conducted wholly outside the sanctioning state's jurisdiction. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, 2026 — mandating duties of up to 100% ad valorem on goods from the five largest buyers of Russian crude or gas [1] — tests the WTO order's foundations.

Erosion of core disciplines

  • Non-discrimination: Article I of GATT requires that any advantage be extended immediately and unconditionally to like products of all members [2]. A tariff keyed to a partner's energy supplier discriminates by origin on grounds unrelated to the product itself.
  • Predictability: a 100% duty overrides bound tariff schedules, the anchor of market access certainty [2].
  • Contested defence: the Article XXI security exception will be pleaded, but stretching "essential security" to cover a third state's commercial choices would render every tariff self-justifying.

Enforcement vacuum deepens the damage

  • The Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since its last member's term ended in November 2020, with 20-plus panel rulings appealed "into the void" [3].
  • MC13 (2024) recommitted members to a fully functioning system, yet reform talks remain unfinished [4]. Illegality without remedy converts rules into leverage.

Asymmetric burden on import-dependent developing economies

  • Coercion bites hardest where buffers are thin: India's strategic reserves of 5.33 MMT (Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur) cover roughly 9.5 days of crude need [5], with about 60 days of industry rolling stock [6] — working stock, not bargaining power.
  • Trade concessions and energy sourcing become hostage to each other, chilling legitimate South-South trade.

Secondary tariffs thus substitute unilateral discretion for negotiated rules, accelerating fragmentation into power-based blocs. The credible response is institutional, not retaliatory: revive binding appellate review, seek a multilateral discipline on extraterritorial measures, and simultaneously build domestic resilience through reserve expansion and supplier diversification. A rules-based order, as the WTO's founding principles affirm [2], remains the surest shield for developing economies against coercive economic statecraft.

Sources

  1. 1H.R. 5334 — Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, Congress.govup to 100% ad valorem duty on the five largest importers of Russian crude/gas
  2. 2WTO, Principles of the Trading System / GATT 1994 Article I (Analytical Index)MFN obligation, unconditional extension, tariff binding and predictability
  3. 3WTO, Dispute Settlement — Appellate Bodyvacancies since November 2020; appeals "into the void"
  4. 4WTO, MC13 outcome on dispute settlement reform (1 March 2024)ministerial commitment to a functioning system, work unfinished
  5. 5Strategic Crude Oil Reserves, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (PIB)5.33 MMT at three locations, about 9.5 days of crude requirement
  6. 65th IGoM on West Asia — India has 60 days of crude, 60 days of gas, 45 days of LPG rolling stock (PIB)industry rolling stock position

More from this note