Examine how India balances its energy relationship with Russia against its economic and strategic partnership with the United States.
India imports over four-fifths of its crude requirement [5], making energy sourcing a core national interest rather than a foreign-policy preference. Its balancing act lies in retaining discounted Russian oil while deepening an economic and strategic partnership with Washington that increasingly treats that oil as leverage.
The Russian pull
- Since 2022, Russia has supplied roughly a third of India's crude imports, up from a negligible pre-war share [5], cushioning the import bill and domestic inflation.
- Continuity is defended on welfare grounds: the MEA frames it as ensuring energy security for 1.4 billion people through diversified sourcing and evolving market dynamics [4].
The American counter-pull
- The US remains India's largest export market and a partner in defence, technology and Indo-Pacific balancing, with a bilateral trade deal under negotiation [4].
- Washington converts this into pressure: Executive Order 14329 (August 2025) imposed an additional 25% duty on Indian goods for importing Russian oil [2], and the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, 2026 authorises tariffs up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy, subject to presidential waiver [1].
Instruments of balance
- Quiet calibration, not capitulation — volumes are trimmed and suppliers diversified (West Asia, Africa, the Americas) [5] without conceding that another state may set India's energy policy.
- Diplomatic engagement over confrontation — concerns conveyed to US interlocutors at senior levels, with industry consultation to cushion exporters [4].
- Legislative outreach, echoing the India-specific CAATSA waiver amendment moved in the US House in 2022 [6]; the February 2026 revocation of the additional duty [3] shows negotiation, not defiance, delivers relief.
India's balance is therefore issue-based rather than bloc-based — the essence of strategic autonomy. Sustaining it requires accelerating supplier diversification, strategic reserves and renewables, so that reduced Russian dependence becomes a sovereign economic choice rather than a concession extracted by sanctions.
Sources
- 1H.R.5334 — Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, Congress.govtariffs up to 100% on largest buyers of Russian oil/gas, presidential waiver
- 2Executive Order 14329, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation", Federal Register (11 Aug 2025)additional 25% ad valorem duty on Indian goods
- 3Modifying Duties to Address Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation, Federal Register (11 Feb 2026)removal of the additional duty on India
- 4Ministry of External Affairs, Media BriefingsIndia's response: energy security for 1.4 billion people, engagement with US interlocutors, trade deal talks
- 5Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell, Import/Export of Crude Oil and Petroleum ProductsIndia's import dependence and country-wise crude sourcing
- 6Congressman Ro Khanna — India-specific CAATSA waiver amendment, US Houselegislative precedent for an India carve-out