Examine the institutional architecture of India–Central Asia cooperation and assess whether it has translated into commensurate economic outcomes.

Central Asia, India's "extended neighbourhood", has acquired a dense, multi-tier institutional framework since the first India–Central Asia Summit of 27 January 2022 [2]. Yet the depth of this architecture is not matched by trade and investment flows, which remain well below stated potential [1].

The institutional architecture

• Summit and ministerial tier: the virtual Leaders' Summit (January 2022) created a standing structure, sustained through the 4th India–Central Asia Dialogue of Foreign Ministers, New Delhi, June 2025 [3].
• Security tier: the 3rd meeting of NSAs/Security Council Secretaries (Bishkek, October 2025) institutionalised counter-terrorism and Afghanistan consultations [1].
• Bilateral tier (Uzbekistan as template): the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation (13th meeting, 2022, co-chaired by the Commerce Minister), Foreign Office Consultations, and Joint Working Groups on Defence, Counter-Terrorism and Digital Technologies [1].
• Defence and people-to-people tier: exercise DUSTLIK (6th edition in India, April 2025); India Study Centres, ICCR Chairs, and four Indian universities operating in Uzbekistan [1].

Economic outcomes: real but modest

• Trade has grown steadily — India–Uzbekistan trade rose from about USD 443 million (2020) to USD 980 million (2024), roughly 2.2 times [1].
• Institutional agreements have produced concrete spillovers: the 2018 digital cooperation MoU helped redraft Uzbekistan's IT Policy, and Tashkent's first IT Park (2019) was set up with Software Technology Parks of India support [1].

The commensurability gap

• Bilateral trade stays under a billion dollars and Indian investment near USD 451 million, concentrated in pharmaceuticals, healthcare and education [1].
• Landlocked geography is the binding constraint: absent full operationalisation of the INSTC and Chabahar, summitry cannot lower logistics costs.
• Multiple parallel tracks risk fragmenting engagement without a single trade-facilitation instrument.

The architecture has succeeded in building political trust and security convergence; its economic dividend now depends on converting dialogue into delivery. Prioritising connectivity corridors, an India–Central Asia trade framework, and the Bilateral Investment Treaty route of September 2024 [1] can align outcomes with the Summit's ambition of a genuinely integrated extended neighbourhood.