Examine why 'multi-alignment' may be inadequate for India's security interests in a changing West Asia.
In this answer
'Multi-alignment' — simultaneously deepening ties with Riyadh, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi without binding security commitments — suited an era when West Asia was largely India's economic hinterland. As the region turns into an active conflict theatre, this hedging is increasingly inadequate for India's hard security needs.
A changed regional order narrows the neutral space
- Post-Abraham Accords realignment and open Israel–Iran–US hostilities have polarised the region; India's partners are now adversaries in live conflict, shrinking the ambiguity multi-alignment depends on.
- Crisis management has become recurrent rather than exceptional, requiring inter-ministerial coordination on West Asian contingencies [1] — reactive machinery, not a security doctrine.
Security stakes now exceed what diplomacy alone can insure
- Energy security: nearly 70% of crude and 85% of natural gas imports come from the region, exposing India to the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint despite diversification of routes [1].
- Diaspora: about one crore Indians in the GCC, remitting over $35 billion annually, create a standing evacuation and welfare liability [2].
- Maritime commerce: sea lanes carrying this trade need protection; IMEC is officially framed as adding to India's maritime security [3], but corridors require escort and surveillance capability, not goodwill.
- Crucially, hedging generates no obligation of assistance — no partner is bound to secure Indian shipping or citizens in a crisis.
Competing commitments are already forcing choices
- India's 10-year Shahid Beheshti terminal contract at Chabahar (2024) with Iran [4] coexists uneasily with I2U2 cooperation alongside Israel and the US [5]; sanctions and conflict can hold such assets hostage.
Multi-alignment remains a sound diplomatic posture but an insufficient security one. India should convert breadth into depth — logistics and defence-cooperation agreements, joint exercises, maritime domain awareness and coordinated evacuation frameworks — using I2U2 and IMEC as platforms. Structured partnerships, pursued without alliance entanglement, would strengthen rather than surrender India's strategic autonomy.
Sources
- 1Inter-Ministerial Briefing on Recent Developments in West Asia, PIB70% crude and 85% gas import dependence on West Asia; Hormuz route exposure; crisis coordination
- 2India and Gulf Cooperation Council, Ministry of External Affairs~10 million Indian diaspora in GCC and over $35 billion in annual remittances
- 3IMEC initiative to add to India's maritime security: Shri Piyush Goyal, PIBIMEC's maritime security dimension
- 4Long-term Main Contract for Shahid Beheshti Port Terminal, Chabahar, PIB10-year India–Iran Chabahar contract signed 13 May 2024
- 5Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, UAE and the United States (I2U2), MEAI2U2 minilateral cooperation with Israel and the US