·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Examine the role of cesses and surcharges in Centre–State fiscal relations, using the Central Road Fund as an illustration.

New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →
In this answer
  1. Role: why the Centre uses them
  2. Central Road Fund (CRF) as an illustration
  3. Concerns for states

Cesses are levies set aside for a stated purpose. Surcharges are a tax on a tax. Both are kept out of the divisible pool under Article 270 [1], so the Centre does not share them with states. Their share of the Centre's gross tax revenue rose from about 10–15% (2011–20) to an estimated 24% in 2020-21 [2]. This makes them a growing pressure point in fiscal federalism.

Role: why the Centre uses them

  • Earmarking: they give assured money to national priorities such as roads, education and clean energy.
  • Fiscal room: money raised as a cess stays with the Centre. The same money raised as ordinary excise would be shared with states as the Finance Commission recommends [1].

Central Road Fund (CRF) as an illustration

  • Colonial origin: after the Jayakar Committee, extra duty on petrol was given to provinces as block grants for road development [3]. This was an early tied transfer.
  • Linked to price: in 1988, a fixed levy of a few paise per litre was replaced by 5% of the basic price of petrol and diesel [4]. The CRF Act, 2000 then made the cess on petrol and HSD statutory [5].
  • Merit: road users pay through fuel, and highways and rural roads get steady money that does not depend on yearly budget cuts.

Concerns for states

  • Shrinking pool: a fuel cess takes the place of excise that would have been shared, so states get less in real terms.
  • Tied, not untied: states build and maintain most roads, but they get CRF money only for works the Centre approves. This reduces their autonomy.
  • Diversion: the CAG found ₹48,130.71 crore of road cess was not moved into the CRF during 2010-11 to 2016-17 [6]. In 2018-19, ₹10,157 crore of road and infrastructure cess was neither transferred nor used for its purpose [7].
  • Trust deficit: when the money is diverted, the cess becomes a general tax with a road label. This is why states demand a cap.

Cesses are a useful tool for earmarking money, but heavy use moves revenue away from states. The way forward is to:

  • cap cesses at a share of gross tax revenue, with sunset clauses;
  • move collections above the cap into the divisible pool;
  • transfer the full cess to the CRF, as the CAG has urged [6];
  • design a road charge for the electric-vehicle era that is linked to price.

These steps would keep earmarking for roads while restoring the tax-sharing design of Article 270.

Sources

  1. 1Cesses and Surcharges: Concept, Practice and Reform – Study for the 15th Finance Commission (Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 2018)cesses and surcharges are outside the Article 270 divisible pool
  2. 2PRS Legislative Research – State of State Finances 2021-22share of cesses and surcharges in the Centre's gross tax revenue
  3. 3Council of State Debates, 4 March 1930extra petrol duty given as block grants for road development under the Road Development Committee scheme
  4. 4Rajya Sabha Debates – Parliamentary Question, 31 July 19911988 resolution raising accruals from 3.5 paise/litre to 5% of the basic price of petrol and diesel
  5. 5Central Road (and Infrastructure) Fund Act, 2000 – India Codestatutory cess on petrol and high-speed diesel
  6. 6CAG Report No. 44 of 2017 – Financial Audit on Accounts of the Union Governmentshort transfer of road cess to the CRF; full cess should go to the designated fund
  7. 7CAG Press Release on Report No. 4 of 2020 – Accounts of the Union Government 2018-19₹10,157 crore of road and infrastructure cess neither transferred nor used for its purpose

More from this note