·PIB·15 marks·250–350 words

Examine the role of the DRDO–DPSU–certification-agency ecosystem in achieving Aatmanirbharta in defence. What bottlenecks remain?

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In this answer
  1. Role of the ecosystem
  2. Bottlenecks that remain

Self-reliance in defence needs a full chain: a lab that designs, a factory that builds, a certifier that checks and a force that inducts. DRDO's maiden live jump of the Advanced High-Altitude Parachute (AHAP) at Nyoma, Ladakh (Oct 2026) shows this chain working end to end [1]. However, gaps in moving from prototype to induction persist.

Role of the ecosystem

  • DRDO labs (design): ADRDE, Agra designed AHAP, a static-line parachute for mass drop of troops at up to 18,000 ft [1]. With DEBEL, Bengaluru, it also developed MCPS, the only Indian service parachute that can be deployed above 25,000 ft [2].
  • DPSUs (production): Ordnance Parachute Factory, Kanpur makes AHAP [1]. It now works under Gliders India Limited, one of the companies formed when the OFB was corporatised in 2021 to bring autonomy and accountability [4].
  • Certification agencies (independent checks): DGAQA inspects and CEMILAC certifies airworthiness [1]. Keeping these roles separate builds checks into the process.
  • Technology handover: after the lab handed over the AHSP for the P-7 heavy-drop parachute, the Army ordered 146 systems [3]. This is the template for going from design to induction.
ADRDE (design) → OPF/GIL (build) → DGAQA (inspect) → CEMILAC (certify) → AHSP → Army order

Fig.: Indigenous lab-to-field chain

Bottlenecks that remain

  • Delays: the Standing Committee on Defence found that 23 of 55 DRDO projects were not completed on time. It cited technical difficulties, denial of foreign technology and rising costs [5].
  • Funding squeeze: DRDO's share of defence spending keeps falling, and R&D allocations fell short of what was asked for [5]. This hurts the costly phase of repeated trials.
  • Gap between prototype and induction: AHAP's first jump was from 16,000 ft, below its 18,000 ft ceiling, and it was a single jump, not a mass drop. No AHSP handover or order has been announced yet [1].
  • Scaling up production: GIL still has to show it can produce at battalion scale, to the prototype's standard, at a cost the Army will pay [4].
  • Weak reviews: delays continued despite reviews at several stages [5].

The DRDO–DPSU–certifier chain has given India fully domestic designs, manufacturing and certification, as AHAP and MCPS show. The way forward is time-bound user-trial and induction roadmaps, more money for trials, and standard review benchmarks, as the Standing Committee recommended [5]. These steps would turn proofs of concept into equipment the forces actually use, and make Aatmanirbhar Bharat real along the frontiers.

Sources

  1. 1DRDO Conducts Maiden Live Jump of Advanced High-Altitude Parachute, PIB, 06 Oct 2026AHAP designer, manufacturer, DGAQA/CEMILAC roles, altitudes, induction status
  2. 2Military Combat Parachute System successfully tested at 32,000 feet, PIB, Oct 2025MCPS developers; only system deployable above 25,000 ft
  3. 3DRDO hands over AHSP of P-7 Parachute System, DRDO press release, 13 Nov 2024AHSP handover; Army order for 146 P-7 systems from GIL (OPF) Kanpur
  4. 4Seven new Defence companies carved out of Ordnance Factory Board, PIB, Oct 2021OFB corporatisation, GIL, autonomy and accountability
  5. 5Standing Committee on Defence: Review of the Working of DRDO, PRS report summary23/55 projects delayed, reasons, falling R&D share, review-benchmark recommendations

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