Examine the role and limitations of Joint Parliamentary Committees as instruments of executive accountability in India.

A Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is an ad hoc body. It is set up by a motion adopted in one House and agreed to by the other, for a specific inquiry and a fixed duration [2]. The Congress's recent demand for a JPC into the IDBI Bank–Fairfax sale [1] shows both its value as an accountability tool and its limits.

Role in executive accountability

• Deep scrutiny of scandals: JPCs probed the Bofors deal, the securities scam and 2G spectrum. Each put contested executive decisions under sustained legislative examination.
• Investigative powers: a JPC can examine documents and question ministry officials, and reach independent conclusions [2].
• Bicameral, cross-party membership: members come from both Houses. One example is a 30-member JPC with 20 Lok Sabha and 10 Rajya Sabha members [4]. This gives its findings wider legitimacy.
• Follow-up: the government must report the action taken on its recommendations [3]. This keeps the issue on the public record.
• Legislative scrutiny: complex Bills, such as the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, are sent to JPCs for detailed and less adversarial review.
• Constitutional value: a JPC puts into practice the executive's collective responsibility to Lok Sabha (Art. 75(3)).

Limitations

• No constitutional or statutory basis: a JPC exists only if a House passes a motion [2]. The ruling majority can therefore refuse one, and Opposition demands often go unmet.
• Majoritarian composition: membership mirrors party strength. Reports often split on party lines, with dissent notes.
• Recommendatory only: a JPC cannot quash an executive decision, and its findings can be ignored.
• Time lag: inquiries are slow while executive action moves on. The CCEA approved the IDBI sale on 14 October 2026 [5], and regulatory clearance is the remaining step. A JPC could at best review the deal after it happens.
• Confidentiality barriers: the executive may cite commercial sensitivity to withhold material, such as the valuation reports the Opposition seeks [1].
• Overlap and politicisation: a JPC duplicates the roles of the PAC and the CAG, and is often used as a political pressure tactic rather than for fact-finding.

JPCs remain Parliament's sharpest tool for inquiry, but they depend on political consensus rather than law. Several reforms would make them real instruments of accountability: clear rules on when a JPC is formed, time-bound mandates, publication of action-taken reports, and stronger standing committees like the PAC. That would uphold the constitutional ideal of an executive answerable to Parliament.