Examine the role of the Vice-President as ex-officio Chairman of the Rajya Sabha in keeping the House impartial.

Under Article 64, the Vice-President is ex-officio Chairman of the Council of States and may hold no other office of profit [1]. Unlike the Lok Sabha Speaker, the Chairman is not a member of the House he presides over. This design builds in neutrality, but the practice of the office shows some strains.

Constitutional safeguards for impartiality

• Outsider status: The Chairman is elected by MPs of both Houses, not by Rajya Sabha members alone. The incumbent, C. P. Radhakrishnan, presides over the House by virtue of being Vice-President [2]. He therefore owes no seat in the House to any party.
• Restrained vote: Under Article 100, the Chairman does not vote in the first instance. He has only a casting vote to break a tie [5]. This keeps the chair out of partisan divisions.
• No judge in his own cause: Under Article 92, he does not preside while a resolution for his removal is under consideration [5].
• Accountability: Under Article 67(b), he can be removed by a Rajya Sabha resolution passed by a majority of all its members and agreed to by the Lok Sabha, after 14 days' notice [1].
• Quasi-judicial role: The Chairman decides Tenth Schedule defection petitions. For example, in 2008 the Chairman gave a written ruling under paragraph 2(1)(a) [4]. In Kihoto Hollohan (1992), the Supreme Court held that the Chairman acts as a tribunal whose decisions are subject to judicial review [3].

Limitations in practice

• Partisan route to office: The 2025 election was a contest between the ruling-side and opposition candidates, which ended 452 to 300 [2]. This can create a perception that the Chairman is aligned with one side.
• Narrow judicial oversight: Courts review defection rulings only for jurisdictional errors such as mala fides or perversity [3]. Because the Schedule sets no deadline for deciding petitions, delays in deciding them can tilt the outcome.
• Discretion over the floor: Rulings on admitting motions and on disciplining members depend largely on how the presiding officer uses his discretion.

In short, the Constitution gives the Chairman strong formal tools for neutrality, but those tools work only if the officer exercises restraint. Possible reforms include time-bound disposal of defection petitions, conventions of consulting all parties, and transparent written rulings. Such steps would make the Chairman's neutrality more visible and uphold the constitutional morality that Article 64 intends for the "House of Elders".