Examine the use of tariffs as an instrument of geopolitical coercion in contemporary international relations, with reference to the 2026 US Russia sanctions law.

Tariffs, historically instruments of revenue and industrial protection, are increasingly wielded as levers of geopolitical pressure. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, authorising duties of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy, is the sharpest recent illustration [1].

Why tariffs have become the preferred coercive tool

• They operate below the threshold of armed conflict, are calibrated, reversible and cheaper than military action.
• They carry extraterritorial reach: secondary sanctions penalise third states for trade that is lawful under their own law.
• A statutory basis, rather than an executive order, makes the threat harder to reverse and thus more credible — the pattern set by CAATSA (2017), which India faced over the S-400 purchase [2].

The 2026 law examined

• Raises duties up to 100% ad valorem on goods from countries among the five largest importers of Russian crude or natural gas, alongside sanctions on Russia's energy and defence sectors and its "shadow fleet" of tankers [1].
• Exempts states importing under 15% of Russia's gas exports that show "significant reduction efforts" — a threshold left undefined, making relief a matter of negotiation rather than compliance.
• Authority is discretionary, not mandatory — coercion here lies in the threat, not the act.

Limits of coercion by tariff

• Fungibility: oil merely reroutes to other buyers; global supply and Russian revenue fall far less than intended.
• Incidence mismatch: duties strike exporters of unrelated goods, not the refiners making the purchase decision.
• Such measures strain MFN and WTO norms, and push targets toward alternative payment and supply arrangements.

Implications for India

• With import dependence near 88% of crude needs, India's stated position is that purchases follow market factors and the energy security of 1.4 billion people [3][4].
• India's answer lies in continued supply diversification — crude now sourced from roughly 40 countries — documented reduction, and the quiet waiver route used effectively under CAATSA [4].

Tariff coercion is thus a powerful signalling device but a blunt corrective one, imposing costs on parties least able to alter the conduct targeted. For India, strategic autonomy is best preserved not by confrontation but by diversifying supply, deepening renewables and reserves, and negotiating exemptions early — securing both energy access and the space to choose its partners.