The fiscal stress of Indian State governments reflects a structural asymmetry in Indian federalism rather than fiscal profligacy. Critically examine.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →States are the primary providers of health, education, agriculture and irrigation, yet the buoyant tax handles rest largely with the Union. With aggregate state fiscal deficit at 3.2% of GSDP and outstanding liabilities near 27.6% of GSDP [1], the stress is largely structural — though state-level choices decide its depth.
The case for structural asymmetry
- Constitutional design: Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule assigns income tax, customs and IGST to the Union; states retain narrower bases like stamp duty, land revenue and profession tax. Article 293(3) makes Union consent mandatory for borrowing where central loans are outstanding, limiting fiscal autonomy.
- Hard borrowing ceiling: the Fifteenth Finance Commission caps state fiscal deficit at 3% of GSDP, with 0.5% conditional on power-sector reform [4] — a uniform rule across very unequal revenue bases.
- Committed expenditure trap: salary, pension and interest absorb about half of revenue receipts on average, exceeding 60% in Kerala, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Assam [1], crowding out capital spending. Interest payments alone rose from 10.9% to 11.8% of revenue receipts between 2016-17 and 2024-25 [1].
- Post-GST volatility: with GST compensation ended in 2022, states absorb revenue shocks while relying on market borrowing through State Development Loans [5].
Where profligacy is a fair charge
- Nine states budgeted over ₹1 lakh crore on cash transfer schemes in 2024-25 [1] — discretionary, recurring and rarely means-tested.
- Discom losses doubled in 2022-23 [1]; deferred tariff and distribution reform is a self-inflicted drain.
- Off-budget borrowings through PSUs and SPVs understate true liabilities, weakening FRBM discipline.
- Only Gujarat, Maharashtra and Odisha approach the FRBM Review Committee's 20% debt-to-GSDP ceiling for states [3][1] — divergent outcomes under an identical federal design show state choices matter.
Thus asymmetry sets the constraint; prudence determines the outcome within it. The Sixteenth Finance Commission (2026-31) offers the window — larger untied devolution, rationalised Centrally Sponsored Schemes, off-budget disclosure and power reform can align cooperative federalism with fiscal sustainability.
Sources
- 1State of State Finances 2024-25, PRS Legislative Researchfiscal deficit 3.2% of GSDP, outstanding liabilities 27.6%, committed expenditure and interest-payment ratios, cash transfer spending, discom losses, states meeting the 20% ceiling
- 2State of State Finances, October 2025, PRS Legislative Researchcontinued worsening of committed expenditure and deficit position
- 3FRBM Review Committee Report, Volume I, Department of Economic Affairs (2017)recommended 20% debt-to-GSDP ceiling for states
- 4Report of the Fifteenth Finance Commission for 2021-263% of GSDP fiscal deficit limit with 0.5% power-sector relaxation
- 5State Finances: A Study of Budgets, Reserve Bank of Indiastate market borrowings through State Development Loans
Practice
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