The G7 increasingly mirrors the fault lines of the post-unipolar world rather than the consensus-building body it was designed to be. Critically examine with reference to the 2026 Évian Summit.

Q. The G7 increasingly mirrors the fault lines of the post-unipolar world rather than the consensus-building body it was designed to be. Critically examine with reference to the 2026 Évian Summit. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Founded at Rambouillet in 1975 to coordinate advanced economies' response to an oil shock, the G7 remains an informal forum with no secretariat and non-binding decisions. The 52nd summit at Évian-les-Bains (June 15–17, 2026) exposed real strain within the bloc — but not paralysis.

Fault lines visible at Évian - Intra-bloc economic rivalry: the US threatened tariffs of 10–12.5% on 60 trading partners, including the EU, UK, Australia and India — allies treated as trade adversaries, not partners [2]. - Divergent threat perception: the US–Israel war on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz closure crowded out Ukraine, obliging European leaders to actively push Ukraine back up Trump's agenda [3]. - Burden-sharing asymmetry: transatlantic differences over sustaining Ukraine's defence and pressuring Moscow reflect competing readings of European security [3]. - Structural weakness: with no permanent secretariat and non-binding communiqués, the G7 lacks any mechanism to bind a dissenting hegemon.

Where consensus still held - Évian produced a joint communiqué and nine declarations, including agreement on the immediate and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz [1]. - Leaders committed to expanded air-defence and long-range support for Ukraine and further sanctions on Russian oil and gas [1]. - On trade, members accepted coordination on macroeconomic imbalances while "avoiding future trade wars" [1]. - Agenda widening — AI safety, critical minerals, health financing [1] — plus outreach to India, Brazil and others, with PM Modi addressing the AI session [4], shows adaptation to a multipolar order.

The Évian record therefore supports the statement only partly: the G7 is less a fractured club than a hedging coalition, where fault lines are structural yet convergence survives wherever interests genuinely align. Its continued relevance lies in institutionalising outreach to the Global South and routing outcomes through the G20 and WTO reform, so that plurilateral consensus reinforces — rather than replaces — the rules-based multilateral order.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. The outcomes of the G7 Summit in Évian — Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France (2026) — joint communiqué and nine declarations; Hormuz reopening; Ukraine military support and Russia sanctions; trade coordination language; AI and critical minerals 2. G7 meeting in France: What's on agenda, who is attending? — Al Jazeera (15 June 2026) — threatened tariffs of 10–12.5% on 60 trading partners including India, UK, EU and Australia 3. G7 allies scramble to put Ukraine back atop Trump's agenda as war drags on — NPR (16 June 2026) — Iran war displacing Ukraine; allied divergence over Ukraine policy 4. PM addresses the session on "Ensuring a Safe, Rapid and Efficient Rollout of Artificial Intelligence" at the G7 Summit in Évian — PIB (2026) — India's participation in G7 outreach on AI