"Great-power stabilisation does not necessarily mean the end of great-power rivalry." Discuss with reference to recent US-China engagement.

Great-power stabilisation means managing competition so that it does not turn into crisis. It does not mean reconciliation. Recent US-China engagement shows the two running together. Both sides seek "a constructive relationship of strategic stability" while the contest over technology, resources and Taiwan carries on [1].

Signs of stabilisation

• Frequent summits: Trump and Xi are due to meet at the G20 in Miami at year-end. The report calls this an unusual four meetings in a year [1].
• Stated intent: both capitals openly aim for greater strategic stability [1].
• Wider talks: Trump has signalled a possible meeting with Putin and Xi. Practical outcomes could centre on stabilising global energy [1].
• Overlapping crisis agenda: the US prioritises the Russia-Ukraine conflict and non-proliferation, and China supports peace talks [1].

Why rivalry persists

• Technology: semiconductor restrictions remain in place, so chips stay a tool of strategic leverage [1].
• Trade and resources: tariffs and rare earths are still contested, and supply chains stay weaponised [1].
• Sovereignty: Taiwan remains a core irritant that dialogue alone cannot settle [1].
• Status contest: Chinese analysts played down Trump's "G2" remarks in Beijing. Beijing is wary of a US-defined power-sharing frame [1].
• Divergent priorities: Russia is the "most enthusiastic" about a trilateral. Scholar Su Liuqiang expects only an informal, low-profile exchange, while China balances ties with the US, Russia, Europe and Ukraine [1].
• Legitimacy limits: there is strong opposition to deals that bypass Ukraine and Europe, so big-power understandings cannot settle conflicts on their own [1].

Implications for India

• A US-China-Russia understanding could narrow India's room to deal with each power separately. Strategic autonomy therefore becomes more important.
• Calmer energy markets would help India as an energy-importing economy [1]. However, continued chip and rare-earth contests mean continued supply risk.

Overall, US-China ties show managed rivalry: guardrails at the top and competition underneath. Stabilisation lowers the risk of conflict but leaves the structural contest in place. India should diversify its semiconductor and critical-mineral supply chains, deepen multi-alignment and push for inclusive peace processes that follow the UN Charter's principle of sovereignty. Stabilisation is a floor under rivalry, not an end to it.