The 'in-house procedure' for addressing judicial misconduct lacks statutory backing and transparency. Discuss its adequacy in ensuring judicial accountability without compromising independence.

Adopted by a full court resolution of the Supreme Court in 1997, alongside the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, the in-house procedure lets the CJI receive and inquire into complaints against judges through peer committees [1]. It fills the space between judicial impunity and near-impossible impeachment — but its non-statutory, confidential design caps how far it can deliver accountability.

Strengths: a shield for independence

• Peer-led inquiry keeps discipline inside the judiciary, consistent with the reasoning that struck down the NJAC (2015) — executive involvement in judicial personnel decisions impinges on independence [3].
• The only statutory alternative, removal under Articles 124(4)/218 with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, needs a special majority in both Houses and has never culminated in a judge's removal [2]; the in-house route offers a response short of that.
• Confidentiality protects judges from motivated or litigant-driven allegations they cannot publicly rebut.
• It supplies real remedial levers — withdrawal of judicial work, advice to resign, and transfer under Article 222 on the CJI's recommendation [4].

Weaknesses: thin on accountability

• No statutory basis: no fixed timelines, no appeal, and no recourse for a complainant if the CJI does not act — matters move on internal correspondence alone.
• Opacity: inquiry reports are ordinarily not published, so outcomes cannot be independently verified.
• No graded sanctions in law: findings short of removal end in moral persuasion, and transfer relocates rather than resolves misconduct.
• Administrative misconduct is poorly covered — "master of the roster" case allocation and appointments to bodies like Permanent Lok Adalats — as recurring controversies in High Courts illustrate.
• Peer adjudication invites perceptions of collegiality bias.

The procedure is therefore necessary but incomplete: adequate as a first response, inadequate as a system. A statutory judicial standards framework with time-bound inquiry, published outcome summaries and calibrated penalties — while retaining judicial primacy in the inquiry itself — would let accountability and independence reinforce, rather than trade off against, each other.