"IBSA has outlived its relevance in the age of an expanded BRICS." Critically examine, with reference to cooperation such as IBSAMAR.

The Brasilia Declaration (2003) created IBSA. It brings together three large, pluralist democracies from Asia, Africa and South America [2]. BRICS has now expanded and IBSA's summit track is dormant. Even so, functional strands such as the naval exercise IBSAMAR show that IBSA has become weaker but has not become obsolete.

Arguments that IBSA has lost relevance

• Summit paralysis: only five leaders' summits have been held, and the last was in Pretoria in 2011 [2]. In 2025 the leaders met only on the sidelines of the G20 [3].
• Overlap with BRICS: all three members are in BRICS, which now leads the Global South agenda. That agenda covers UNSC reform and alternative finance through the New Development Bank.
• Thin delivery: in nearly two decades the IBSA Fund has allocated just over US $53.27 million to 46 projects [2]. That is small next to BRICS-scale finance.
• Low-impact agenda: many recent IBSA events are working groups, a coffee festival and webinars [2].
• Episodic security cooperation: IBSAMAR is a biennial drill. It builds interoperability but does not provide security at sea on a regular basis.

Arguments that IBSA remains relevant

• Trusted democratic format: IBSA leaves out China and Russia. This lets India pursue sensitive security cooperation that would be harder inside an enlarged BRICS.
• IBSAMAR as a functional anchor: IBSAMAR IX (2026) has the theme "Stronger Together Towards a Shared Future in the Maritime Domain". It brings INS Tarkash together with Brazilian and South African ships and a submarine for anti-submarine warfare, VBSS (Visit, Board, Search and Seizure) and anti-piracy drills [1]. The previous edition, IBSAMAR VIII, was held on schedule at Simon's Town in 2024 [4].
• Expanding security track: the first IBSA NSAs' meeting was held under India's chairship in 2021 [2].
• Strategic geography: the Red Sea disruptions pushed shipping around the Cape of Good Hope. This made IBSAMAR's waters a vital Indian Ocean–Atlantic link for Indian trade.
• South–South credibility: IBSA Fund projects run in 34 partner countries, and most of them are LDCs (Least Developed Countries) [2]. This advances SDG 17.

IBSA has declined as a political summit, but it survives as a working security and development network that BRICS cannot replace. A standalone sixth summit could restore its political direction. Maritime information-sharing between IBSAMAR editions would keep cooperation going between exercises, and holding the exercise in Brazil's Atlantic waters would test the Atlantic side of the partnership. With these steps, IBSA could act as a like-minded democratic core within BRICS rather than a rival to it. That fits India's multi-alignment and its vision of a reformed, multipolar order.