Impersonation of judicial authority to influence court proceedings strikes at the root of the rule of law. Discuss the adequacy of existing IPC/BNS provisions in deterring such offences.

Personating a public servant is an offence under Section 170, IPC, now Section 204, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 [2][3]. When the office falsely assumed is judicial, the wrong extends beyond one officer to the adjudicatory process itself — the very foundation of the rule of law.

Why such impersonation strikes at the root

• Corrupts adjudication: in the recent Delhi case, calls made in 2017 to a judicial officer by a caller posing as a Supreme Court judge sought to influence a bail decision; the Tis Hazari court called it an attack on the sanctity and integrity of the judicial process [1].
• Undermines equality before law (Article 14): an order procured through pressure substitutes influence for evidence.
• Erodes public confidence, on which judicial authority — lacking purse or sword — entirely rests.

Adequacy: where the law is strong

• Layered coverage — personation (S.170), threat of injury to a public servant (S.189) and anonymous criminal intimidation (S.507) can be charged together; consecutive sentences here totalled eight years' rigorous imprisonment [1][2].
• BNS strengthens deterrence: S.204 introduces a minimum of six months and up to three years with fine, against IPC's two-year ceiling, while S.351(4) retains anonymity as an aggravating factor [3][4].

Adequacy: persisting gaps

• Penalties remain modest relative to the gain from a favourable bail or interim order.
• Delay dilutes deterrence — a 2017 offence sentenced only in 2026 [1].
• No distinct, graver offence for impersonating judicial authority; it is treated like any personation.
• Rackets often run from within custody, exposing prison supervision failures; the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 was circulated to States for adoption but uptake remains uneven [5].
• Absence of caller-verification protocols for communications reaching judicial officers.

Existing provisions are therefore sound in principle but weak in delivery. Deterrence needs speedy trial in designated courts, a graded offence for impersonating judicial officers, verified communication channels for the judiciary, and faster State adoption of prison reforms — so that the promise of equal justice remains substantive, not merely formal.