"The independence of the Election Commission depends as much on its internal culture as on the appointment process." Critically examine this in light of the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023.

Article 324 gives the Election Commission of India (ECI) superintendence, direction and control of elections, "subject to any law made by Parliament" on appointments [1]. Parliament used that power in the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 [2]. The statement is largely valid. The appointment process sets the conditions for independence, and internal culture decides whether the Commission actually acts independently.

Why the appointment process matters: gaps in the 2023 Act

• Executive majority: In Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Supreme Court proposed a panel of the PM, the CJI and the LoP. The Act replaces the CJI with a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, which gives the government a 2:1 majority [1].
• Vacancy clause: A selection is valid even if a seat on the panel is vacant. If there is no LoP, the ruling side alone can choose [1].
• Pay: Pay moves from the level of a Supreme Court judge, which Parliament sets, to the level of the Cabinet Secretary, which the executive sets [1].
• Narrow pool: Only Secretary-rank officers are eligible. Judicial expertise is left out, even though the ECI does quasi-judicial work [1].

Why internal culture matters equally

• The same constitutional powers produced very different Commissions over time. The T.N. Seshan era shows that leadership and a willingness to act can activate powers that already exist.
• Collegial functioning means open deliberation, recorded dissent and transparent decisions. These build public trust in the Commission, whatever the appointment route.
• Process integrity: In the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, the ECI's phased rollout, safeguards and Special Roll Observers [3][4] show that voter confidence depends on how the Commission runs its daily work.

Limits of the statement

• Structure limits culture. The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge, but an EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation. This discourages internal dissent, and fixing it needs a constitutional amendment [1].
• Without its own secretariat, the ECI depends on staff lent by the government. The Goswami Committee (1990) recommended an independent secretariat, but the Act does not provide one [1].

Conclusion

Independence therefore needs both sound rules and the right institutional culture, and each weakens without the other. Parliament should restore a neutral member to the Selection Committee, set pay by law, create an independent secretariat and give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC. The ECI should, in turn, build a culture of transparency and recorded dissent. Together these would uphold free and fair elections as part of the basic structure of the Constitution.