"The independence of the Election Commission rests as much on its method of appointment as on its constitutional status." Examine this in light of the 2023 Act and the Anoop Baranwal judgment.

Under Article 324, the President appoints the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) "subject to any law made by Parliament". For over seven decades, no such law existed [1]. The Anoop Baranwal judgment and the 2023 Act show that constitutional status alone cannot secure the Commission's independence. Who selects the referee matters just as much.

Constitutional status: necessary but not enough

• Security of tenure: the CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge, and service conditions cannot be changed to the CEC's disadvantage (Article 324(5)) [1].
• These safeguards protect an officer only after appointment. They cannot stop a pliant person from being chosen. ECs, who can be removed on the CEC's recommendation, have even weaker protection [1].

Anoop Baranwal (2023): appointment as the gateway

• A Constitution Bench linked the Commission's independence to free and fair elections, which are part of the basic structure [4].
• It set up an interim panel of PM + Leader of Opposition (LoP) + CJI until Parliament made a law [4]. This matched the Law Commission's 255th Report (2015) [3].

2023 Act: status unchanged, method tilted

• The Act replaces the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM. This gives the executive a permanent 2:1 majority, which PRS says "may undermine" the Commission's independence [1][2].
• Vacancy clause: recommendations stay valid even when a seat is vacant. If the Lok Sabha is dissolved and there is no LoP, the panel is made up only of government members [1].
• The Selection Committee may choose "any person", including someone not on the Search Committee's shortlist [1].
• Counter-view: Article 324(2) gives Parliament this power, and Baranwal's arrangement was only interim [1][4]. The SC also refused to stay appointments in March 2024 [6].
• Ongoing review: in a split ruling (2026 INSC 1040), Justice Datta took the prima facie view that the Act ignored Baranwal. The Bench asked the CJI to place the case before a Constitution Bench [5].

Comparative lens

• South Africa requires a judge on its electoral commission, and the USA bars sitting office-holders. India's Act does the reverse [1].

Constitutional status protects the Commission's tenure, but the method of appointment decides its credibility from day one. Parliament need not wait for a court order. It could adopt the Law Commission's PM–LoP–CJI model, let the leader of the largest Opposition party fill a vacant LoP seat, and give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC [3][1]. These reforms would fulfil Article 324's purpose and the basic-structure guarantee of free and fair elections.