How does India balance energy security imperatives with its trade negotiations with Western partners? Illustrate with recent FTA negotiations.

India imports a large share of its energy, so affordable and diversified energy supply is a core national interest. Since 2025, Western partners have tried to link India's purchases of Russian oil to market access for Indian goods. India has handled this in three ways: it keeps energy out of trade deals where it can, adjusts for tactical reasons when the cost of holding firm rises, and runs several negotiations at once.

Energy-security imperatives

• Affordability: The MEA said Russian crude imports were driven by market factors and served the energy security of 1.4 billion people [3].
• Strategic autonomy: India will not let any one partner decide where it buys energy.
• Clean transition: India needs green technology and finance from the West.

India–U.S. track: bargaining under tariff coercion

• Linkage imposed: In August 2025, the U.S. put an extra 25% duty on Indian goods because India was importing Russian oil [2]. The MEA called this "unfair, unjustified and unreasonable" [3].
• Tactical adjustment: The U.S. removed the extra duty in February 2026. It cited India's commitments to stop buying Russian oil and to buy more U.S. energy, but it kept the option to reimpose the duty [4].
• Holding the line: The Finance Minister now says the deal has reached a "plateau", that further demands would be "very difficult", and that the U.S. is "weaponising" tariffs [1].

India–EU FTA: energy kept separate from trade

• India and the EU concluded the FTA on 27 January 2026 after nearly two decades of talks [5]. It is due to be signed in December 2026 [1].
• Russian oil was not a condition and played no "determinative role" [1].
• Transition gains: These include a green hydrogen task force and a proposed €500 million Green Transition Assistance package [7].
• The catch, CBAM: The EU's carbon border tax entered its paying phase on 1 January 2026. It applies to imports such as steel, aluminium and cement [6] and remains outside the FTA. India secured only a forward-MFN clause (any CBAM relief the EU later gives another country also applies to India) and talks on recognising Indian carbon pricing [7].

India's approach comes down to three moves. It separates energy from trade where the partner allows it (the EU). It concedes tactically where coercion bites (the U.S.). It hedges by pursuing both tracks in parallel. Next, India should diversify its crude suppliers, build a credible domestic carbon price, and secure a firm timetable for CBAM recognition before the EU deal is signed. This would protect both its strategic autonomy and SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy).