India–Republic of Korea relations have moved from economic to strategic convergence. Examine with reference to recent defence and naval cooperation.

India–Republic of Korea (ROK) ties were long built on trade under the 2010 CEPA. On 18 May 2015 they were upgraded to a Special Strategic Partnership [1]. Recent defence and naval cooperation shows that a security core is forming, but the shift is still incomplete.

Economic foundation

• Trade-led ties: bilateral trade was USD 25.6 billion in 2025, of which India imported USD 19.2 billion [2].
• CEPA (2010) remains the economic anchor. Talks to upgrade it reached their 12th round in May 2026 [3].

Strategic convergence through defence and naval cooperation

• Institutional framework: the 2015 joint statement called for navy staff talks, cooperation between shipyards and a Vice-Ministerial 2+2 dialogue [1]. The Joint Strategic Vision 2026–30 plans the first 2+2 meeting and a Joint Committee on defence industry [4].
• Naval exercises: the inaugural IN–RoKN exercise was held in October 2025 [5]. The second edition ended at Busan on 29 October 2026 with ROKS Munmu the Great. It included expert exchanges, coordinated navigation and helo operations aimed at interoperability and Indo-Pacific stability [6].
• Indigenous capability on display: INS Sahyadri, an indigenously built Shivalik-class stealth frigate, represented India [7].
• Defence-industrial links: the K9-Vajra howitzer joint venture is in its second production batch [4]. The 2017 shipbuilding MoU nominated Hindustan Shipyard Ltd [8]. Cochin Shipyard signed a long-term MoU with HD KSOE in 2025 [9].

Limits of the convergence

• Basic drills: the exercises have so far covered only basic drills, with no anti-submarine or live firing reported. Both editions were held in Korean waters [5][6].
• Warship MoU yet to deliver: the 2017 MoU has not yet produced a visible warship project [8].
• Economic strain: India's trade deficit has risen significantly since the CEPA [3]. This may weaken domestic support for deeper ties.

The relationship has clearly added a strategic layer to its economic base, but the convergence is still partial. Hosting the exercise in turn, adding harder drills, tying the shipbuilding MoU to naval projects and agreeing a balanced CEPA upgrade would help. Together, these would turn the Joint Strategic Vision [4] into a lasting pillar of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.