India–ROK ties are moving from an economic to a strategic-defence focus. Discuss in light of recent developments.

India–ROK ties were built on trade. The CEPA came into force in 2010, the same year as the Strategic Partnership, which was raised to a Special Strategic Partnership in 2015 [1]. Recent developments add a clear defence and maritime layer. This is a broadening of the relationship on top of its economic base, not a replacement for it.

Economic foundation: still the bedrock

• CEPA-driven growth: trade rose from USD 14.2 bn when CEPA began to USD 26.89 bn in 2024–25 [2].
• Ambitious targets: the two sides aim for USD 50 bn by 2030. The 2026 VOYAGES framework covers shipbuilding, shipping and logistics [1]. Its main project is a 2.5 million GT greenfield shipyard at Thoothukudi [3].

The strategic-defence turn

• Naval interoperability: the inaugural bilateral naval exercise was held in October 2025. In October 2026, INS Sahyadri, an indigenous stealth frigate, arrived at Busan to exercise with ROKS Munmu the Great [1][4].
• Multilateral convergence: a ROK destroyer took part in MILAN and IFR-2026, and ROK attended IONS. Most significantly, ROK joined IPOI in April 2026 [1].
• Defence-industrial co-production: K9 Vajra shows this best, with 100 more guns ordered from Hanwha–L&T in 2025 [1]. The 10th Joint Committee on Defence Industries and Logistics Cooperation met in September 2026 [5].
• Political framing: the 2026 State Visit adopted a Joint Strategic Vision 2026–30. The first Indian War Memorial in Korea was opened at Paju [1].

Limits: a shift still in progress

• Thin exercise base: the exercise is only a year old and involves a single frigate. Much of it takes place in harbour, and it has no fixed name or cycle yet [4].
• Unfulfilled naval industry: the 2017 shipbuilding MoU with HSL has not yet produced a warship [6].
• Trade imbalance: in 2024–25, India imported about USD 21 bn from ROK and exported about USD 5.8 bn. That is a deficit of roughly USD 15 bn. The CEPA upgrade is targeted for the first half of 2027 [2].

The relationship is therefore adding a strategic-defence layer to its economic one, not moving away from trade. To consolidate this, the two sides should give the naval exercise a fixed cycle and expand it. They should also add naval repair and spares to the Joint Committee's agenda and use the CEPA upgrade to correct the trade imbalance. These steps would make the "Special" partnership a pillar of a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific, as IPOI envisions.