India's acceptance of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies reflects a calibrated balance between conservation and livelihood security. Critically examine.

On 20 July 2026, India became the 123rd WTO Member to accept the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS). The agreement had entered into force on 15 September 2025 [2]. India accepted Phase 1 and kept bargaining hard on Phase 2. This largely balances ocean conservation with fishers' livelihoods, but the balance is not complete.

Conservation: commitments India can honour

• Phase 1 bans subsidies for IUU fishing and overfished stocks [2] and for fishing on the unregulated high seas. These are the most harmful practices, so the ban advances SDG 14.6.
• The cost to India is low. Its support averages about US$15 per fisher and goes mostly to safety and subsistence, not to industrial fleets fishing far out at sea [1].
• Accepting gives India credibility as a responsible maritime nation while it keeps its leverage for Phase 2 [1].

Livelihood: policy space preserved

• Subsidies for fuel, gear, ice and vessels are central to Indian state schemes. They fall under Phase 2, which is still being negotiated [1].
• India wants a 25-year transition within EEZs and a per-fisher benchmark. Its case is fairness: fleets in the EU, US and China get US$1,000 or more per fisher [1].
• At MC13, India pointed out that fuel makes up about 22% of global fisheries subsidies. Most of this is non-specific (not limited to fishers), and the draft texts left it out [4].

Where the calibration falls short

• Conservation gains stay partial. Phase 1 does not touch subsidies that drive overcapacity (too many boats chasing too few fish).
• Fuel support is inefficient. The OECD finds that input subsidies push up fishing effort the most. In some cases, less than 10% of a fuel subsidy's value reaches fishers [5].
• The timelines clash. Under Article 12, the AFS ends if comprehensive disciplines are not adopted within 4 years of entry into force [3]. A 25-year transition does not fit inside that window.
• Small boats can overfish too. Large artisanal fleets can deplete coastal stocks, and the OECD's point about cheap inputs applies to them as well [5].
• Capacity gaps. India still has weak stock-assessment capacity, and WTO enforcement is weaker while the Appellate Body is non-functional.

India's acceptance is a carefully calibrated beginning: a low-cost conservation commitment that keeps livelihood leverage intact. The real test is Phase 2. Before MC15, India should:

• link longer transitions to stock assessments that show stocks are healthy;
• move PM Matsya Sampada Yojana support from fuel towards safety, insurance and monitoring;
• build a Bay of Bengal (BOBP-IGO) coalition behind a per-fisher proposal [1][3].

This would line up equity with SDG 14 and keep the ocean commons sustainable for future generations.