·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

"India's approach to illicit foreign assets has shifted from exchange control to tax-based deterrence." Critically examine with reference to the Black Money Act, 2015.

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In this answer
  1. The Shift: Control to Tax Deterrence
  2. Strengths
  3. Weaknesses

In 1976, officials went after the foreign accounts of returning scientists, doctors and Gulf workers as anti-smuggling exchange-control cases. They found over 400 cases worth about ₹30 lakh [1]. The Black Money Act (BMA), 2015 takes a different route: it taxes and prosecutes undisclosed foreign assets. The shift is real, but the deterrence it promises has only partly arrived.

The Shift: Control to Tax Deterrence

  • FERA era: holding foreign money abroad was itself the offence. Enforcement meant tracing returnees one by one [1].
  • BMA, 2015: a flat 30% tax on undisclosed foreign assets with no deductions, plus a penalty of three times the tax [3].
  • Criminal backing: a ₹10 lakh penalty for not disclosing assets in returns. Wilful evasion is a scheduled offence under PMLA, 2002 [2].
  • With FEMA, 1999 making exchange violations civil matters, tax law now does most of the deterring.

Strengths

  • Revenue focus: the one-time compliance window drew 648 disclosures worth over ₹4,000 crore and brought in about ₹2,500 crore in tax and penalty [4].
  • Proportionality: a ₹20 lakh de minimis limit spares small holders [2]. The 1976 regime, by contrast, punished migrants' savings [1].
  • Incentive to disclose: Section 67 bars using declarations as evidence in FEMA proceedings, which encourages voluntary disclosure [2].
  • Severity: rigorous imprisonment of 3 to 10 years for wilful evasion [3].

Weaknesses

  • Weak follow-through: 652 cases raised demands of over ₹17,000 crore, but only 163 prosecutions have been launched [4]. A demand is not a recovery, and a prosecution is not a conviction.
  • Low uptake: disclosures were modest, which suggests that mainly those who feared detection came forward [4].
  • Moral hazard: repeated amnesties (VDIS 1997, the BMA window, IDS 2016) teach evaders to wait and are unfair to honest taxpayers.
  • No baseline: the White Paper on Black Money (2012) gave no official estimate of offshore wealth [5], so success cannot be measured.

India has moved from treating foreign assets as an exchange-control problem to treating them as a matter of tax and criminal liability. However, the law's deterrence depends on enforcement it has not yet shown. The way forward is to publish recovery and conviction data, match automatically exchanged account data against tax returns, and keep the 2015 window truly one-time. That would make the BMA a credible step towards SDG 16.4 on curbing illicit financial flows.

Sources

  1. 1"Foreign bank accounts: 400 cases detected", The Hindu, 50 Years Ago column, 27 Oct 20261976 drive: 400+ cases, ~₹30 lakh, returning professionals, exchange-control/anti-smuggling framing
  2. 2The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 — PRS₹10 lakh penalty, ₹20 lakh de minimis, PMLA scheduled offence, Section 67 FEMA protection
  3. 3The Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets (Imposition of Tax) Bill, 2015 — PRS Bill Track30% flat tax with no deductions, penalty of three times the tax, 3–10 years RI for wilful evasion
  4. 4Ministry of Finance reports 652 black money cases and 163 prosecutions — All India Radio News (Lok Sabha reply, Aug 2024)648 disclosures, >₹4,000 crore declared, ~₹2,500 crore collected, >₹17,000 crore demands, 163 prosecutions
  5. 5White Paper on Black Money, Ministry of Finance (2012) — Income Tax Departmentno official estimate of black money held abroad

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