·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme marks a shift from energy-efficiency trading to carbon pricing. Examine its design and the challenges in putting it into practice.

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In this answer
  1. Design of the CCTS
  2. Challenges in putting it into practice

Under the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme, industries traded energy-saving certificates. The Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), 2023, notified under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022, instead prices greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. Its design is sound; its credibility depends on implementation.

Design of the CCTS

  • Baseline-and-credit, intensity-based: firms get GHG emission-intensity targets (tCO2e per unit of output), not absolute caps, suiting a growing economy [2].
  • Phased coverage: 282 entities in aluminium, cement, chlor-alkali and pulp & paper (October 2025), plus 208 in refineries, petrochemicals, textiles and secondary aluminium (January 2026) [2].
  • Two tracks: a compliance mechanism for obligated entities; a voluntary offset mechanism for others [1].
  • Institutions: National Steering Committee (Power and Environment ministries), BEE as administrator, Grid-India as registry [1]; CERC regulates trading.
  • Enforcement: firms beating targets earn tradable Carbon Credit Certificates; those missing them must buy certificates or pay environmental compensation at twice the average price [3].

Challenges in putting it into practice

  • Oversupply (PAT legacy): PAT issued about 103 lakh certificates against a 52-lakh purchase obligation, and trades stayed at the floor price [4]. Lenient targets could repeat this.
  • Weak deterrence: PAT non-compliance rose from 9% (Cycle I) to 56% (Cycle II); a 2× penalty is mild against 5–10× in China's ETS [4].
  • Narrow coverage: thermal power has not been moved into the CCTS [1], though it emits nearly 40% of India's GHGs; initial sectors cover only about 10% [4].
  • MRV credibility: entities self-monitor and appoint their own verifiers; BEE can re-check only after the compliance period [4].
  • Delays: PAT cycles ended years behind schedule [4]; certificate issuance and exchange trading are yet to be tested at scale.
  • External recognition: how far the EU's CBAM will credit CCTS prices paid by exporters is unsettled; intensity targets and modest ambition may be read narrowly [5].

The CCTS gives India a development-sensitive carbon price, but surplus credits and self-verified data will not change behaviour. Tightening baselines on a published path, scheduling power-sector entry, escalating penalties for repeat offenders and rotating verifiers [4] would make it a credible tool for India's emission-intensity NDC and 2070 net-zero goal, consistent with common but differentiated responsibilities.

Sources

  1. 1PIB — Framework for Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), Ministry of Powercompliance and offset tracks; NSC, BEE, Grid-India roles; thermal power not moved over from PAT
  2. 2PIB — Government notifies Greenhouse Gas Emission Intensity Targets for 208 more Carbon-intensive Industriesintensity-based targets; October 2025 (282 entities) and January 2026 (208 entities) rounds
  3. 3PRS Legislative Research — Monthly Policy Review, October 2025GEI Target Rules; certificates for over-achievers; CPCB environmental compensation at twice the average price
  4. 4ORF — Design Without Discipline: The Role of Incentives and Enforcement in India's Carbon Market (2026)PAT oversupply and floor price; rising non-compliance; China penalty comparison; power-sector share; MRV gaps; delays; reform recommendations
  5. 5ORF — India is Fighting CBAM. It Should Also Help Shape the Rules (2026)unsettled CBAM Article 9 credit for CCTS prices; intensity targets and modest ambition

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