"India's continued participation in SCO meetings hosted by Pakistan shows the compartmentalisation of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy." Critically examine.

In September 2026, MEA Joint Secretary Alok Dimri led India's delegation to the SCO National Coordinators' meeting in Islamabad. It was the first official Indian visit to Pakistan since Operation Sindoor [1], which struck nine terror camps after the Pahalgam attack [2]. The visit largely shows deliberate compartmentalisation, but that approach has limits and costs.

Evidence of compartmentalisation

• Multilateral duty, bilateral freeze: India attends meetings under Pakistan's SCO Chairpersonship without resuming bilateral dialogue. Kashmir stays bilateral: India rejected Erdoğan's UNGA reference to Kashmir during the same week [1].
• Consensus leverage: SCO decisions need consensus. If India stayed away, it could not shape the drafts for the 2027 Islamabad Summit or the terms of Türkiye's membership bid [1].
• Presence shapes texts: An SCO document that left out the Pahalgam attack was questioned in Parliament [3]. The Tianjin Declaration (2025), negotiated with India present, reflected its firm stand against terrorism [4].
• Platform for India's case: At Qingdao (2025), Rajnath Singh condemned cross-border terrorism "as an instrument of policy" and briefed members on Operation Sindoor [5].

Limits of compartmentalisation

• Optics for Pakistan: Hosting the meetings brings Pakistan regional prestige and lets it argue that India cannot isolate it [1].
• Perceived softening: Within one month, India raised its representation from a Chargé d'affaires (SCO-RATS meeting) to a Joint Secretary [1]. This may be read as diluting India's line that "terror and talks cannot go together".
• Boundaries blur: Bilateral disputes still spill into multilateral forums. India and Pakistan clashed at the UNGA through rights of reply only days earlier [1].
• Summit dilemma: The August 2027 Summit will force a high-visibility choice on the level of India's representation [1].

Assessment Compartmentalisation is real but calibrated. India kept its representation below Secretary level and strictly multilateral. A boycott would not have stopped the meeting; it would have left the drafting to China, Russia and Pakistan.

India's presence in Islamabad is therefore strategic compartmentalisation, not normalisation. Going forward, the MEA should link the level of India's attendance at the 2027 Summit to firm terror language in the declaration. This would build on the joint statement on countering radicalisation that the SCO issued during India's 2023 chairship [5]. In this way India can use the SCO to advance its security interests without diluting its bilateral position.