India's cyber-incident reporting framework focuses on security breaches but ignores reliability failures. Critically examine this in the light of recent global cloud outages.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →India's main reporting rule is the CERT-In Directions of 28 April 2022, issued under the IT Act, 2000. It requires cyber incidents to be reported within 6 hours [2]. The global Microsoft 365 outage of 12–13 November 2026 was blamed on a fault in a network-capacity upgrade. It escaped this duty, because outages caused by technical faults are not covered [1]. The criticism is largely valid, though the focus on security has a logic of its own.
Why the security-centric design is defensible
- Mandate fit: CERT-In is a security-response agency. Its 6-hour window suits threats that can spread to other systems [2].
- Signal vs noise: cloud services slow down or fail in small ways all the time. Requiring every such event to be reported would bury real intrusions.
- Sectoral safeguards exist: RBI's IT-outsourcing Master Direction makes regulated entities keep business continuity and disaster recovery (BCP/DR) plans. It also makes their service providers keep tested BCP/DR frameworks [4].
- Ad hoc response: CERT-In issued a critical advisory during the July 2024 Windows outage, which was caused by a faulty CrowdStrike update [3].
Why it falls short
- Cause, not harm, triggers the duty: a failed upgrade that cuts email for lakhs of users creates no obligation to report [1].
- Information asymmetry: in November 2026 the only account was Microsoft's voluntary apology. Precise details were still awaited [1].
- Critical-sector exposure: IndiGo and Akasa Air warned passengers that email support was disrupted, and Air India rerouted its email [1]. In July 2024, one vendor's faulty update spread across Windows systems worldwide [3].
- Fragmented rules: three sets of rules may apply to outages, and each has a gap [1]. Continuity mandates like RBI's exist only in some sectors [4].
Service outage → Cause?
├─ Attack/intrusion → CERT-In report within 6 hrs
└─ Technical fault → No duty → voluntary disclosure only
Fig: Reporting depends on the cause, not the harm
Way forward
- Digital India Act: a threshold-based duty to report large outages (by users affected or critical sector), with a longer deadline and a root-cause report afterwards.
- Sector regulators such as the DGCA should copy RBI's BCP/DR model [4].
- Multi-vendor redundancy for critical functions, to reduce concentration risk.
India's framework protects well against breaches but has a blind spot for reliability failures, which recent outages show can be just as disruptive. A calibrated outage-disclosure duty, run by sector regulators rather than CERT-In, would close this gap without overloading CERT-In. It would also advance resilient digital infrastructure under SDG 9.
Sources
- 1How does India address service outages? — The Hindu explainer (17 Nov 2026)Microsoft 365 outage and its cause; technical-fault outages excluded; impact on airlines; three rule-sets, each with a gap
- 2CERT-In Directions No. 20(3)/2022-CERT-In dated 28.04.2022 under Section 70B(6), IT Act6-hour reporting duty; scope limited to cyber incidents
- 3CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2024-0035 (19 July 2024)Windows outage caused by a faulty CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor update
- 4RBI (Outsourcing of Information Technology Services) Master Directions, 2023BCP/DR requirements for regulated entities and their service providers