"India's engagement with Myanmar's military-backed government reflects strategic compulsion rather than endorsement." Critically examine this in the light of India's Act East Policy.

India's Act East Policy (2014) runs overland through Myanmar, so India has to deal with whoever governs Naypyidaw [1]. Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is now President, and his first official visit to India (May–June 2026) [2] mainly reflects that compulsion. But the honours it carried blur the line with endorsement.

Engagement as strategic compulsion

• Connectivity: The Kaladan Multi-Modal project (Sittwe–Paletwa–Mizoram) and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway are flagship Act East projects [1]. Kaladan also offers a second route to the Northeast besides the Siliguri Corridor.
• Northeast security: At the 2026 visit, Myanmar repeated its assurance that its territory would not be used against India. India raised the issue of militant groups operating from across the border [2]. India has scrapped the Free Movement Regime and plans to fence the entire 1,643 km border [3].
• China factor: Beijing presses ethnic armed groups into ceasefires while backing the junta and its election [4]. If India stays away, it leaves the Bay of Bengal flank to China.

Where engagement slides towards endorsement

• Legitimation: The UN Special Rapporteur called the election a "facade" to entrench military rule and urged states to reject it [5]. A state visit gives the coup leader's new civilian title credibility.
• Continuing violence: UN investigators documented deliberate military attacks on civilians after the polls [6]. Engaging without conditions signals impunity.
• Limited leverage: China works with both the junta and the armed groups [4]. India talks mainly to Naypyidaw, but Kaladan runs through conflict-hit Rakhine, so assurances from the junta alone cannot secure it.
• Normative cost: It weakens India's image as a democracy that supports people-centric development in its neighbourhood.

On balance, India's engagement is driven by compulsion: geography, security and competition with China leave little choice. But compulsion becomes endorsement when honours run ahead of conditions. India should:

• keep working-level ties to protect its projects and borders;
• reach out to ethnic armed groups and civil society;
• send aid through UN channels;
• link high-level visits to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus benchmarks.

That way Act East serves both India's interests and its constitutional democratic values.