How does India's growing defence engagement with Australia and New Zealand reflect its Indo-Pacific strategy? Critically analyse.

India and Australia share a vision of a "free, open, inclusive and rules-based" Indo-Pacific [2]. The 5th AUSTRAHIND exercise at Thiruvananthapuram (Oct 2026) had an island-coastal theme and, for the first time, a New Zealand observer delegation [1]. It shows this vision becoming military practice, but the depth of cooperation still lags the ambition.

How it reflects India's Indo-Pacific strategy

• Institutional anchoring: The 2009 Strategic Partnership became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2020). The MLSA (logistics pact) was signed to raise interoperability through exercises [2].
• Maritime-littoral focus: The 2026 theme covers sub-conventional operations in island and coastal areas, including surveillance and protection of vital installations [1]. This mirrors the ministers' agreement on joint maritime domain awareness (MDA) by patrol aircraft and on undersea awareness [3].
• Layered dialogue: In 2025 the Raksha Mantri visited Australia, the first such visit in 12 years. The Defence Ministers' Dialogue now meets regularly, alongside the naval exercise AUSINDEX [4].
• Net security provider: HADR training prepares troops for cyclone- and tsunami-prone littorals [1].
• Widening the circle: The India–NZ Defence Cooperation MoU (2025) led to the first bilateral defence talks, which covered the Indo-Pacific security environment [5]. NZ's observer role [1] extends India's outreach into the South Pacific.

Limitations

• Thin jointmanship: The exercise has about 120 troops per side and is led by infantry. Air and sea elements appear only as training "dimensions" [1].
• Not linked to the MDA backbone: The IFC-IOR, Gurugram (2018) [6] is not linked to the exercise's surveillance training [1].
• No step-by-step progression: The lead regiment and terrain change every year (semi-desert in 2025, island in 2026) [1]. Lessons leave with each battalion.
• NZ engagement is nascent: New Zealand is an observer, not a participant [1]. The exercise is not trilateral.
• Chapter VII tension: UN peacekeeping rests on consent, impartiality and minimum force [7]. Training for enforcement-type missions is an awkward fit with this tradition. It also sits uneasily with India's demand that troop contributors be consulted on mandates [8].

India's engagement with Australia and New Zealand reflects a clear Indo-Pacific vision, but it is still more about signalling than operational depth. The way forward:

• Feed IFC-IOR data into future editions.
• Use the MLSA to add ships and aircraft.
• Keep the island theme for several editions.
• Upgrade New Zealand to participant.

These steps would turn AUSTRAHIND into a real pillar of a rules-based, inclusive Indo-Pacific.