India's insistence on 'no double standards' on terrorism has repeatedly tested consensus within the SCO. Critically examine the utility of the SCO for India's counter-terrorism objectives.

At the 25th SCO Council of Heads of Government in Dushanbe (2026), India called for dismantling the "entire ecosystem of terrorism" with "no double standard" [1]. This was said with Pakistan in the room. The SCO is useful to India as a platform to put its position on record. It is much less useful as a tool for enforcement.

Utility of the SCO

• Institutional anchor: the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), Tashkent, is a standing body for counter-terror coordination. India has been a full member since Astana, 2017 [7].
• Norm-building: India's language has moved from calling terror a "crime against humanity" (2021) [2] to "fix accountability on supporters" (2023) [3] and now to dismantling financing and safe havens [1]. This puts state sponsorship on the agenda without naming any country.
• Chair-year leverage: under India's 2023 chairship, all members signed the Defence Ministers' protocol [3].
• Access to adversaries: it gives India a structured channel to China and Pakistan, and to Central Asia, that no other forum offers [7].
• Security–development link: India ties terrorism to lost investment, commerce and youth opportunity, and backs the SCO trade action plan [1]. This gives it standing with Central Asian members.

Limitations

• Consensus veto: at Qingdao (2025), there was no agreed outcome document for lack of consensus [5]. India refused to endorse a text that left out the Pahalgam attack [6], even though its speech called every terror act "criminal and unjustifiable" [4].
• The accused have a vote: China and Pakistan sit inside the forum, so named condemnation is structurally impossible.
• No punitive teeth: RATS coordinates among members but cannot sanction one of them [7]. Rhetoric alone does not dismantle financing networks.
• Forum-shopping needed: India secured condemnation of Pahalgam through the UNSC press statement and the BRICS declaration instead [5].

Assessment The SCO gives India a voice and a veto, not leverage. Refusing to sign stops weak texts from going out, but it also leaves the meeting with no shared message on terrorism.

The SCO is therefore a complementary, not primary, counter-terror platform. India should seek generic, veto-resistant commitments, such as acting on each other's requests about terror financing. It should pair them with enforcement through FATF, UNSC 1267 listings and the CCIT. This would turn "no double standards" from a slogan into an agreed norm, in line with the UN Charter's commitment to collective security.