India's position as a bridge between the West and sanctioned states like Iran — assess with reference to BRICS diplomacy.

India's hosting of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi (September 2026), where Iranian President Pezeshkian attacked unilateral sanctions as harming food security and civilian welfare [1], captured India's distinctive position: a partner of the West that simultaneously voices Global South grievances. The bridge role is real but constrained.

Strengths of the bridge role

• Strategic autonomy in practice: India secured a US exemption for the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, sustaining connectivity with Iran and Afghanistan while remaining a close US partner [2].
• Convening power: as BRICS chair, India shaped the New Delhi Declaration (2026) while keeping the grouping non-confrontational rather than anti-Western [3].
• Normative bridging: India endorses BRICS' critique of unilateral coercive measures — which the Rio de Janeiro Declaration (2025) faulted for harming rights to development, health and food security — while distinguishing these from UN Charter-mandated multilateral sanctions [4].
• Development stake: support for the New Development Bank and local-currency settlement offers sanctioned and vulnerable economies alternatives without rupturing Bretton Woods engagement [4].

Limits of the bridge role

• Asymmetric leverage: the Chabahar waiver is revocable and conditional, exposing India's Iran policy to US discretion rather than Indian choice [5].
• Coalition dilemmas: BRICS' Russia-Iran axis pushes anti-Western framing, while India's Quad and Israel ties pull the other way; hard positions on West Asian conflicts are therefore avoided.
• Capacity gap: de-dollarisation and NDB lending remain modest against dollar-denominated trade, limiting the material relief India can broker.
• Declaratory, not binding: BRICS statements are political, not enforceable instruments.

India is thus less a mediator resolving disputes than a credible interlocutor that keeps channels open and normalises Global South concerns within plurilateral forums. Deepening INSTC–Chabahar connectivity, expanding rupee-based trade, and pressing for humanitarian carve-outs in sanctions regimes would convert this positional advantage into durable influence — consistent with India's constitutional commitment under Article 51 to promoting international peace and respect for international law.