"India's treaty-making process lacks robust parliamentary oversight. Critically examine this claim with reference to the revision of India's Model BIT." (Article 253, executive federalism)

Article 253 empowers Parliament to legislate for implementing international agreements, but negotiation, signature and ratification remain purely executive acts. The ongoing revamp of the 2015 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) — announced in the Union Budget 2025-26 speech [2] and now awaiting Cabinet clearance — brings this accountability gap into sharp focus.

Where the claim holds

• Cabinet, not Parliament, is the author: the Model Text for the Indian BIT was adopted by a Union Cabinet decision in December 2015, with no legislative approval or pre-publication consultation [1]; the revised text is following the same route.
• Executive action of large consequence: acting on the treaties' unilateral termination clauses, India terminated 77 BITs and signed only four new agreements after 2015, leaving a handful in force — an outcome the Standing Committee on External Affairs (2021) itself called inadequate [3].
• Executive federalism: BIT disciplines on expropriation and non-discriminatory treatment bind state-level action on land, mining and environment, yet States have no formal voice in negotiation.
• Fiscal exposure: arbitral awards are met from the public exchequer, and India is among the more frequent respondent States in investor-State arbitration [4].

Where the claim is overstated

• Executive primacy allows speed and confidentiality in bargaining; clause-by-clause legislative vetting would weaken India's negotiating position.
• Ex-post scrutiny exists: the departmental Standing Committee examined India's BIT practice in detail and pressed for faster negotiations, pre-arbitration consultation and domestic arbitration expertise [3]; parliamentary questions and appropriation of award payments add further checks.
• The 2015 model itself embedded sovereignty safeguards — exhaustion of local remedies before arbitration, tribunals limited to monetary compensation, and carve-outs for taxation and national security [1] — mirroring global ISDS reform trends [4].

Oversight is therefore weak before signature rather than wholly absent. Placing the draft model text before the Standing Committee, consulting States and building domestic arbitration capacity would reconcile investor confidence with the democratic accountability Article 253 presumes.