India has signed the Artemis Accords but is not part of the Artemis Programme. Discuss the strategic implications of this distinction for India's space diplomacy.

India became the 27th signatory of the Artemis Accords on 21 June 2023. However, the government has told Parliament that India is not a participant in the NASA-led Artemis Programme [1]. India has agreed to the rules but not joined the missions. This is a deliberate choice, and it brings India's space diplomacy both gains and costs.

Understanding the distinction

• Accords: a set of non-binding principles and best practices for civil exploration and use of outer space [1].
• Programme: NASA's mission to return humans to the Moon. ISRO says it "will explore possibilities" of joining in future [1].

Strategic gains

• Voice in setting rules: India sits with like-minded nations in shaping norms on transparency, interoperability and use of lunar resources.
• Deeper Indo-US ties: India signed during the PM's 2023 US visit. The signing was linked to easing curbs on imports of critical space technology and to NASA training for Indian astronauts [2].
• Strategic autonomy: India has no money or hardware tied to a US timeline that keeps slipping. A Starship engine shutdown in September 2026 may affect NASA's plan to land astronauts on the Moon "as early as 2028" [3].
• Hedging: India avoids looking locked into a bloc as a rival China-led lunar grouping (ILRS) takes shape.

Strategic costs

• Penalty for joining late: early partners shape crew seats, mission roles and payload shares. India risks becoming a rule-taker in lunar operations.
• Perception without benefits: rivals may still see India as Western-aligned, which weakens the hedging gain.
• Capability gap: a country's weight in a partnership depends on what it can build itself. Gaganyaan's uncrewed missions, meant to check safety and reliability, still have to fly before any crewed flight [4].

Way forward

• Fast-track Gaganyaan, the Chandrayaan series and the Bharatiya Antariksha Station under Space Vision 2047 [1].
• Negotiate niche Artemis roles, such as science payloads and ground-station support, that suit India's strengths.

Signing the Accords while staying out of the Programme lets India shape space norms and deepen US ties without depending on an uncertain timeline. India can turn this flexibility into influence by joining lunar partnerships on time and with its own capability behind it. That would fit Space Vision 2047 and the Outer Space Treaty's idea of space as the "province of all mankind."