Does the induction of conventional ballistic missiles risk blurring the line with nuclear deterrence in South Asia? Critically analyse.

India's Pralay is an indigenous, conventional surface-to-surface missile [2]. It cleared user evaluation trials on 5 November 2026, and its induction is now described as imminent [1]. Pakistan is also building a conventional missile force. This raises the question of whether such missiles weaken the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. The risk is real, but how the forces are organised can contain it.

How the line could blur

• Warhead ambiguity: radar can track a ballistic path but cannot see the warhead. A conventional strike on radars or airbases may therefore be read as a nuclear attack, and the enemy has less time to decide how to respond.
• Look-alike missiles: Pakistan has nuclear-capable short-range missiles such as Nasr and Ghaznavi. Its Fatah series is described as dual-use [6]. Mixing the two kinds makes signals in a crisis harder to read.
• China's example: China places nuclear and conventional forces at the same sites. This makes the line between conventional and nuclear attack hard to judge in a crisis [4].
• Faster escalation: in December 2025, two Pralays were fired in quick succession from a single launcher [3]. Pakistan announced its Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) in August 2025 [6]. Together, these could make the next India–Pakistan crisis escalate more sharply [5].

Why the line may actually sharpen

• Separate commands: India's proposed Integrated Rocket Force is to field only conventional missiles such as Pralay. It is separate from the Strategic Forces Command, which launches India's nuclear weapons [4].
• Deterrence below the nuclear threshold: during Operation Sindoor, Pakistan could not use its Babur cruise missile because that missile has a nuclear role. Its ARFC is meant to keep escalation conventional [5]. Missiles dedicated to conventional use give options that stop short of nuclear use.
• Doctrinal restraint: India is seen as unlikely to copy China's risky practice of placing the two kinds of force together [4].
• Existing CBMs: under the 2005 India–Pakistan agreement, each side must give advance notice of ballistic missile flight tests [7]. This lowers the chance of misreading a test.

Conventional ballistic missiles therefore cut both ways. In flight, they add ambiguity. If kept organisationally separate, they also widen the room for limited, non-nuclear deterrence. India should formally declare the Rocket Force conventional-only, keep conventional and nuclear units physically apart, and build on the 2005 pre-notification agreement with further confidence-building measures. Clear separation can make Pralay a tool that strengthens strategic stability.