Insider threats pose a growing challenge to civil aviation security. Examine the adequacy of the Tokyo (1963) and Montreal (1971) regimes in light of recent incidents.

An insider threat comes from someone with authorised access: crew, ground staff or the pilot in the next seat. On 30 September 2026, one pilot stabbed the other in the cockpit of flydubai FZ 1073 [1]. The case shows that the Tokyo (1963) and Montreal (1971) regimes are strong on punishment but weak on prevention.

Recent incidents

• FZ 1073 (2026): a UAE–Israel flight was diverted to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia. The Indian captain was stabbed and the Omani co-pilot arrested. A terror angle is under investigation, not established [1].
• Germanwings 9525 (2015): the co-pilot locked the captain out and crashed deliberately. Medical certification had not stopped a pilot with a mental disorder [4].

Where the regimes are adequate

• Jurisdiction: Tokyo vests jurisdiction in the State of registration without excluding other States [2]. This suits overlapping cases like FZ 1073: a UAE aircraft, a Saudi landing, Indian and Omani crew [1].
• Commander's powers: the commander may restrain an offender and hand them over on landing. Those who assist are immune from proceedings [2].
• Punishment: Montreal makes acts against aviation safety punishable by severe penalties, with prosecute-or-extradite rules [3]. India's 1982 Act gives effect to it [6].

Where they fall short

• Safe-cockpit assumption: Tokyo relies on the commander to keep order [2]. It has no answer when the commander is the victim.
• After-the-fact deterrence: Montreal punishes after the event [3]. It cannot deter a pilot willing to die [4].
• Aircraft as weapon: using a civil aircraft to cause death became a crime only under the Beijing Convention (2010) [5].
• No prevention duty: neither treaty covers crew screening. Indian pilots at Gulf carriers fall outside DGCA's 2023 peer-support circular [7].

Way forward

• ICAO minimum standards on crew psychological screening and non-punitive peer support [7].
• Wider ratification of the Beijing instruments [5].
• An MEA protocol for consular support to Indian crew in foreign investigations.

The Tokyo and Montreal regimes remain the legal backbone for jurisdiction and prosecution, but they were built for threats from the cabin, not the cockpit. Adding Beijing-era offences and ICAO screening standards would shift aviation security from punishment to prevention, so that passenger safety rests on the system, not on one injured pilot.