Inter-State water dispute tribunals have failed to deliver finality. Critically evaluate the institutional framework under Article 262 and suggest reforms.

Article 262 lets Parliament set up a body to decide inter-State river disputes and keep the courts out of them [1]. The Inter-State River Water Disputes (ISRWD) Act, 1956 gives effect to this through ad hoc tribunals [2]. The idea is sound, but delays, weak enforcement and repeated court involvement have kept it from producing final settlements.

Strengths of the framework

• Expert adjudication replaces political bargaining. A published award has the force of a Supreme Court decree [2].
• Federal neutrality: the Centre sets up the tribunal when a State asks, which protects weaker riparian States from bilateral pressure [2].
• Implementation machinery: the Cauvery Water Management Authority and Cauvery Water Regulation Committee were set up after the 16 Feb 2018 Supreme Court verdict [3][4].

Weaknesses: why finality fails

• Chronic delay: the Cauvery dispute was referred in 1990. The award came in 2007, was notified in 2013 and was settled only in 2018 [4]. The Ravi–Beas tribunal ran for over three decades without an award [5].
• Statutory deadlines of three years, extendable by two, have proved ineffective [6].
• Stale data: awards based on facts that are decades old invite pleas of "changed circumstances", such as population growth, urban drinking-water demand and climate variability.
• Judicial re-entry: despite Article 262(2), the Supreme Court hears appeals under Article 136. The Cauvery award effectively merged with the 2018 judgment [3], which turned the Court into the final decider.
• Weak enforcement: in deficit-monsoon years States resist releases, and there is no clear formula for sharing shortfalls.
• Fragmented, ad hoc tribunals have no permanent secretariat or shared database [7].

Reforms

• Pass the ISRWD (Amendment) Bill, 2019. It provides a Disputes Resolution Committee to try negotiation first, a single tribunal with benches, and a 2+1-year deadline for decisions [6][7].
• Set up a basin-wide hydrological data agency so that all States argue from one set of rainfall, flow and groundwater figures.
• Build periodic review clauses into awards, so that recalibration happens on schedule rather than through litigation.
• Agree distress-sharing formulas in advance, and give implementing authorities like the CWMA binding powers.
• Promote river-basin organisations and use the Inter-State Council for political consensus.

The Article 262 framework is sound in principle, but delay and enforcement gaps have weakened it in practice. A time-bound, data-driven tribunal with built-in periodic reviews would turn water disputes into technical exercises in cooperative federalism. It would also secure finality without making allocations rigid, in line with SDG 6 on water management.