The inter-war years saw Indian cotton mills squeezed between British imperial interests and Japanese competition. Examine how colonial tariff policy responded.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →In the inter-war years, Bombay's mills faced cheaper and better Japanese yarn. At the same time, Britain wanted to keep the Indian market open for its own cloth. The colonial state responded with discriminating protection: an industry got tariffs only after the Indian Tariff Board had examined its case [3]. The shelter was real, but it came with imperial strings.
The Squeeze
- Japanese competition: The 1927 Tariff Board enquiry found Japanese yarn better and cheaper. It linked this partly to Japan's labour conditions, such as longer working hours [2].
- Japan moves inside India: In 1926 the Diamond Mill, Bombay, was bought for a Japanese syndicate and renamed Toyo Podar Mills. This was Japan's first entry into cotton manufacturing in India, with the business entirely under Japanese supervision [1].
- British interests: Indian duties had to make room for Britain's export stake, as the Ottawa preference later made formal [5].
How Tariff Policy Responded
- Enquiry before protection: The Board recommended protective tariffs. It also proposed bounties for high-count (fine) yarn and better mill efficiency [2].
- Cotton Textile Industry (Protection) Act, 1930: It protected cotton piece-goods and extended the existing protection for yarn. It passed the Council of State in April 1930 [4].
- Imperial preference (1932): The Indian Tariff (Ottawa Trade Agreement) Amendment Bill set preferential duties that favoured British imports over other foreign goods [5]. India was shielded from Japan but conceded ground to Britain.
- Renewal (1934): The Cotton Textile Industry Protection (Amendment) Bill was passed, which kept the protection in place [6].
Limits of the Response
- Shelter, not capability: The Board itself pointed to problems inside Indian mills: low efficiency, little fine yarn and a narrow product range [2]. Tariffs could not cure these.
- Tariff-jumping: Import duties could not touch Japanese cloth woven in Bombay. Toyo Podar's entry showed this weakness [1].
- Contested policy: Members of the Assembly protested that the Ottawa deal had been agreed for India first and only then brought to them to ratify [5].
Colonial tariff policy did protect Indian mills against Japan, but it was built around Britain's interests. The Tariff Board's own advice was to pair tariffs with bounties and efficiency gains. The lesson for today's textile policy is the same: protection should be time-bound and tied to upgrading. That is the route to self-reliance that lasts.
Sources
- 1The Hindu, "A hundred years ago: Bombay diamond mills" (16 Nov 2026, Page 9)Diamond Mill becomes Toyo Podar Mills; first Japanese entry into manufacturing; Japanese supervision
- 2Report of the Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Textile Industry Enquiry), 1927 — NITI Aayog Digital LibraryJapanese yarn better and cheaper, linked to labour conditions; tariffs plus bounties for fine yarn and efficiency
- 3Indian Tariff Board — Cotton Textile Industry, Vol. I: Representations Submitted (Indian Culture Portal)protection granted only after Tariff Board scrutiny of applicants' cases
- 4Council of State Debates, 3 April 1930 — Cotton Textile Industry (Protection) Bill (Parliament Digital Library)Bill's aims (piece-goods protection, extension of yarn protection); passage
- 5Legislative Assembly Debates, 15 December 1932 — Indian Tariff (Ottawa Trade Agreement) Amendment Bill (Parliament Digital Library)preferential duties favouring British imports; members' objections to the Ottawa deal
- 6Council of State Debates, 19 February 1934 — Cotton Textile Industry Protection (Amendment) Bill (Parliament Digital Library)1934 amendment passed, keeping protection in place