International aviation security law was built around the external hijacker. Examine whether the Tokyo (1963) and Hague (1970) Conventions are adequate for insider threats from flight crew.

On a Flydubai flight to Tel Aviv, the co-pilot allegedly attacked the Indian commander, Captain Smit Machchhar. The wounded captain opened the cockpit door and passengers overpowered the co-pilot [1]. The case tests treaties written for passenger hijackers. They punish such acts in part, but they are weak when the threat sits at the controls.

Design: built for the external hijacker

• Tokyo Convention (1963): gives the state of registration jurisdiction over offences on board. It aims to keep good order under the aircraft commander, and requires states to return control to the lawful commander [2].
• Hague Convention (1970): came after the late-1960s hijacking wave. It criminalises unlawful seizure by force, threat or intimidation, and states must extradite or prosecute the offender, so hijackers find no safe haven [3].

Where they remain adequate

• Neutral wording: the Hague offence applies to "any person" on board, so a crew member who uses force is covered, as with the alleged wounding here [3][1].
• Flag-state reach: the UAE, where the aircraft is registered, can prosecute wherever the act took place [2].
• Domestic updating: India's Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016 gives effect to the 2010 Supplementary Protocol. It adds "technological means" to the definition and punishes attempt [4][5].

Where they fall short

• The remedy depends on the commander: Tokyo's fix of giving control back to the commander fails when the commander is the victim and the attacker is lawfully at the controls [2][1].
• No force, no hijacking: a pilot who crashes the aircraft without force or intimidation may fall outside the definition of "seizure" [3][4].
• Overlapping jurisdiction: India's law covers offences "by or against Indian citizens", which overlaps with the UAE's flag-state claim. Neither treaty clearly says which state takes the lead [4].
• No prevention: the treaties act only after the offence. Crew vetting and cockpit access are left to national regulators [1].

Way forward

• India has already put the 2010 Protocol into its own law [4]. It can press ICAO to add explicit treaty language on crew-insider attacks.
• ICAO should set standards on crew vetting and mental-health monitoring.
• MEA should have a standing consular protocol for Indian aircrew injured or charged abroad.

The conventions are adequate for punishing insiders who use force, but not for preventing attacks or for a crew member who needs no force. Updating them, as the 2010 Protocol updated the Hague Convention, would keep the aim of safe civil aviation intact against threats from inside the cockpit.