"International peer reviews of nuclear security, such as the IAEA's IPPAS, increase transparency but have limited reach over military programmes." Critically examine this with reference to South Asia.

The IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) has run since 1996. A country has to ask for a mission. The mission then gives expert advice on how well the country applies the CPPNM and its Amendment [1]. Pakistan's first IPPAS mission (Sept–Oct 2026) called its regime "robust" [2]. That verdict shows both what these reviews achieve and how far they can reach.

How peer reviews increase transparency

• Voluntary openness: Pakistan is a non-NPT state, yet it let a 7-member team spend 12 days examining its laws, rules and site security [2].
• Testing the regulator: the regulator, PNRA, hosted the mission. The team checked whether practice matches the law, and the IAEA praised Pakistan's "periodic reviews" [2].
• Common standards: IPPAS measures countries against the CPPNM, its Amendment and IAEA guidance. It also shares good practices across countries [1].
• Building confidence: in a region at risk of nuclear terrorism, an outside check reassures neighbours and nuclear suppliers.

Limits over military programmes

• Narrow scope: the team visited only one civilian site, the KANUPP Decommissioning Project, a plant that is being shut down. The IAEA said the regime was in place "at the facility visited" [2].
• Controlled by the host: missions happen only on request, so the host decides the timing and what is opened [1][2].
• Outside the NPT: the UNSC condemned the 1998 India–Pakistan nuclear tests [3]. Neither state has to open its weapons sites to the IAEA.
• Exemptions in national law: India's lapsed NSRA Bill, 2011 allowed the government to exempt defence-related facilities from the regulator [4].
• Insider threat untested: the main risk, collusion by insiders at sensitive sites, cannot be checked at one closed plant.

Way forward for South Asia

• India: the SHANTI Act, 2025 gives the AERB legal status [5]. It was created in 1983 by an executive notification [4]. India should now make sure the regulator works independently of the DAE in practice.
• Show the treaty record: India is a party to the CPPNM Amendment and ICSANT [6]. This gives India an edge in debates over NSG membership.
• Bilateral confidence-building: the 1988 India–Pakistan agreement against attacks on nuclear installations could be extended to cover nuclear-security information.

So the statement largely holds. IPPAS makes civilian nuclear security more open but cannot check weapons programmes. South Asia needs voluntary reviews, independent regulators and India–Pakistan confidence-building measures used together. This fits the UNSCR 1540 aim of keeping nuclear materials away from non-state actors.