Internet shutdowns are increasingly used as a tool of law and order in India. Examine their legality under the Telecommunications Act, 2023 in light of the proportionality doctrine laid down in *Anuradha Bhasin*.

Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 lets the Union or a State suspend telecom services during a "public emergency" or "in the interest of public safety" [1]. In Anuradha Bhasin (2020), the Supreme Court held that speech and trade over the Internet are protected under Art. 19(1)(a) and (g) [2]. A shutdown therefore needs more than a statutory basis to be lawful. It must also be proportionate.

Statutory framework

• Authority: Union and State Home Secretaries issue orders under the Temporary Suspension of Services Rules, 2024 [3].
• Safeguards: Orders must give reasons, name a defined area and a duration, and be published. Review Committees headed by the Cabinet Secretary or the Chief Secretary examine them [3].

Proportionality tests from Anuradha Bhasin

• Legitimate aim and least-restrictive means: The restriction must serve a lawful goal, and milder measures must be considered first [2].
• Temporary, not indefinite: Indefinite suspension is not allowed, and orders must be reviewed periodically [2].
• Published and reasoned: Orders must be made public so that courts can review them [2].

Where practice fails the test

• Undefined triggers: The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Communications and IT (2021) found that "public emergency" and "public safety" had no definition and no criteria for judging need [4]. The 2023 Act keeps the same words [1].
• Routine use: States have imposed district-wide or state-wide shutdowns to conduct exams and to control local crime, which are not emergencies [3][4].
• Blanket, not targeted: Whole-Internet bans also cut off payments, healthcare and education. The UN notes that shutdowns affect "millions beyond" their target and rarely meet the tests of legality, necessity and proportionality [5].
• Weak oversight: Review Committees include only executive officials. The Rules do not say how orders should be published, and review findings need not be made public [3].
• No evidence of effectiveness: The Committee found that no study had shown shutdowns actually improve public safety [4].

Way forward

• Define the triggers in the Rules, and block specific services instead of the whole Internet [4].
• Add retired judges and public members to Review Committees [4].
• Create a central public database of suspension orders [3].

The 2023 Act and 2024 Rules give shutdowns a clear statutory basis and partly write Anuradha Bhasin into law. However, being legal on paper is not the same as being proportionate in practice. Defined triggers, targeted blocking and independent review would make shutdowns a rare last resort, in line with Article 19 and the Standing Committee's recommendations.