·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

"The internet was designed as a 'network of networks', but market forces have centralised it." Examine the implications for national security and digital sovereignty.

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In this answer
  1. How market forces centralised it
  2. Implications for national security
  3. Implications for digital sovereignty
  4. Way forward

The internet was built as a decentralised "network of networks", so that one failure could not bring down the rest. Economics has since moved it towards a few hyperscale cloud providers. The recent global Microsoft 365 outage, which Microsoft blamed on a faulty network upgrade, showed that this concentration turns efficiency into systemic risk.

How market forces centralised it

  • Owning dedicated servers became too costly. Shared cloud infrastructure brought the cost per user down sharply, so even large firms moved to the cloud.
  • Only a few providers operate at hyperscale. Switching costs then lock users in.

Implications for national security

  • Single point of failure: one provider's error can stop governments, hospitals and businesses at the same time. Supervisors have to judge concentration across the whole system, not firm by firm [1].
  • Operational failure can lead to cyber risk: after the 2024 CrowdStrike-linked outage, CERT-In warned that attackers were using it for phishing and fake recovery tools [2].
  • Critical Information Infrastructure that NCIIPC protects (Sec 70A, IT Act) increasingly runs on privately owned cloud systems, with little direct state oversight.

Implications for digital sovereignty

  • Foreign jurisdiction: core state systems depend on foreign-headquartered firms. Their outages, laws or sanctions can disrupt Indian services, which limits strategic autonomy.
  • Data control: where data is stored and who can access it shapes sovereignty. The DPDP Act, 2023 lets the Centre restrict transfers of personal data abroad.
  • Accountability gap: standard service contracts cap the provider's liability, so the public bears the losses.

Way forward

  • Extend RBI's model: RBI's outsourcing directions treat cloud services as outsourcing that must be risk-assessed and governed [3]. Similar rules, including tested exit plans, should apply to hospitals and ministries.
  • Multi-cloud and sovereign cloud: MeghRaj/GI Cloud, empanelled domestic providers, and offline fallbacks for essential services.
  • System-wide mapping: CERT-In and the sector regulators should map which critical institutions depend on which providers [1].

Centralisation brought affordability and scale, but it also concentrated security and sovereignty risk. India does not need to leave the cloud. It needs resilience by design: diversified providers, enforceable continuity plans and open, interoperable Digital Public Infrastructure. This would restore the internet's founding principle of redundancy and serve SDG 9's goal of resilient infrastructure.

Sources

  1. 1World Bank Digital Finance: Monitoring of System-Level Concentration and Interconnectedness: outsourcing concentration as a systemic risk; supervisors should monitor it across the whole system
  2. 2CERT-In Current Activity CICA-2024-3308: Phishing campaign exploiting the CrowdStrike outage (July 2024): phishing and fake recovery tools after the global outage
  3. 3RBI Managing Risks in Outsourcing Directions, 2025 (28 Nov 2025): cloud computing treated as outsourced IT, subject to risk assessment and governance

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