"The internet was designed as a 'network of networks', but market forces have centralised it." Examine the implications for national security and digital sovereignty.
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The internet was built as a decentralised "network of networks", so that one failure could not bring down the rest. Economics has since moved it towards a few hyperscale cloud providers. The recent global Microsoft 365 outage, which Microsoft blamed on a faulty network upgrade, showed that this concentration turns efficiency into systemic risk.
How market forces centralised it
- Owning dedicated servers became too costly. Shared cloud infrastructure brought the cost per user down sharply, so even large firms moved to the cloud.
- Only a few providers operate at hyperscale. Switching costs then lock users in.
Implications for national security
- Single point of failure: one provider's error can stop governments, hospitals and businesses at the same time. Supervisors have to judge concentration across the whole system, not firm by firm [1].
- Operational failure can lead to cyber risk: after the 2024 CrowdStrike-linked outage, CERT-In warned that attackers were using it for phishing and fake recovery tools [2].
- Critical Information Infrastructure that NCIIPC protects (Sec 70A, IT Act) increasingly runs on privately owned cloud systems, with little direct state oversight.
Implications for digital sovereignty
- Foreign jurisdiction: core state systems depend on foreign-headquartered firms. Their outages, laws or sanctions can disrupt Indian services, which limits strategic autonomy.
- Data control: where data is stored and who can access it shapes sovereignty. The DPDP Act, 2023 lets the Centre restrict transfers of personal data abroad.
- Accountability gap: standard service contracts cap the provider's liability, so the public bears the losses.
Way forward
- Extend RBI's model: RBI's outsourcing directions treat cloud services as outsourcing that must be risk-assessed and governed [3]. Similar rules, including tested exit plans, should apply to hospitals and ministries.
- Multi-cloud and sovereign cloud: MeghRaj/GI Cloud, empanelled domestic providers, and offline fallbacks for essential services.
- System-wide mapping: CERT-In and the sector regulators should map which critical institutions depend on which providers [1].
Centralisation brought affordability and scale, but it also concentrated security and sovereignty risk. India does not need to leave the cloud. It needs resilience by design: diversified providers, enforceable continuity plans and open, interoperable Digital Public Infrastructure. This would restore the internet's founding principle of redundancy and serve SDG 9's goal of resilient infrastructure.
Sources
- 1World Bank Digital Finance: Monitoring of System-Level Concentration and Interconnectedness: outsourcing concentration as a systemic risk; supervisors should monitor it across the whole system
- 2CERT-In Current Activity CICA-2024-3308: Phishing campaign exploiting the CrowdStrike outage (July 2024): phishing and fake recovery tools after the global outage
- 3RBI Managing Risks in Outsourcing Directions, 2025 (28 Nov 2025): cloud computing treated as outsourced IT, subject to risk assessment and governance